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PROJECT
THE LESSONS OF CREATION-SCIENCE:
PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND
THE RELIGION CLAUSES
INTRODUCTION
Religious groups have long sought to use public schools to transmit
their religious doctrine.' Historically, these efforts have taken two
forms: 1) public school presentation of religious doctrine for its reli-
gious value2 and 2) prohibition of teaching material that conflicts
with religious doctrine. 3 These methods of conforming public school
1. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968): School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
2. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (prayer recitation and
Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962) (prayer recitation);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (release-time program); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1948) (same); Brandon v. Board
of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1980) (voluntary school prayer), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 970 (1981); DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384
F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1967) (prayer recitation), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968);
Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.) (voluntary school prayer), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 464 F. Supp.
911, 917-18 (D.S.D. 1979) (Christmas pageants), aff'd, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980). In School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), a
Pennsylvania statute required the reading of ten verses from the Bible each day. Id.
at 205. The proponents of the program alleged that although the material was
religious it did not abridge the establishment clause because the Bible chosen for
inclusion in the program was non-sectarian. Id. at 210. The Court determined that
reading passages from a non-sectarian Bible does not immunize the religious material
from establishment clause prohibition. Id. at 223-24. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962), the New York State Board of Regents composed an official prayer which
they recommended be recited at the beginning of each school day. Id. at 422-23. The
proponents of the program did not deny its religiosity; rather they contended that
because the prayer was denominationally neutral, it satisfied the establishment
clause requirements. Id. at 430. The Court determined that government composition
of a prayer and its required recitation is impermissible religious activity and struck
down the program. Id. at 436. Justice Stewart, however, indicated that school
prayer does not necessarily involve impermissible government sponsorship of reli-
gion. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 316-18 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-50 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). One
commentator has suggested that prayer could permissibly be a part of the public
school curriculum. See Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitu-
tional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 368-71 (1963).
3. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a
statute forbidding the teaching of the theory of evolution violates the establishment
clause. The Court rejected the state's argument that the purpose of the law was to
ensure religious neutrality, holding that "[t]he law's effort was confined to an at-
tempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical
account, literally read." Id. at 109. The law was held to be a clear violation of the
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curriculum to the dictates of religious dogma violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment. 4
Certain Fundamentalist Christian groups have, through use of
novel legal arguments, made a concerted effort to have creation-
science included in the curriculum of public primary and secondary
schools. 5 Creation-science is a collection of statements that allege
scientific support for the Biblical account of creation.6 It posits the
sudden creation of the universe, recent inception of the earth and its
lifeforms, a separate ancestry for man and apes, and the historic
occurrence of a worldwide flood. 7 Creationists argue that teaching
the theory of evolution in public schools violates free exercise of reli-
gion by undermining the religious beliefs of students who adhere to
the inerrancy of the Biblical account of creation.8 Creationists pro-
pose that this alleged violation of a student's free exercise must be
remedied by "neutralizing" presentations of the theory of evolution by
establishment clause because, "the First Amendment 'does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.' " Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
4. Id. at 106 ("There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not
permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.")
5. See Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 486-87 (6th Cir. 1975); McLean v.
Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260-61 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Steele v.
Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Tenn. 1975) (per curiam); Public Funds for Textbooks
Presenting Evolutionary Theory of Origin Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First
Amendment, 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 262, 263 (Cal. 1975); Balanced Treatment for
Scientific Creationism and Evolution Act, Op. Att'y Gen. at 1 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979).
6. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259-63 (E.D. Ark.
1982) (court found that creation-science uses scientific data to attempt to validate
Biblical creationism); see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1666(a) (Supp. 1981) (enumerating a
six-part definition of creation-science); Institute for Creation Research, Scientific
Creationism 11-13 (H. Morris ed. 1974) (contends creation-science is a legitimate
scientific theory); Gish, Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence, Am.
Biology Tchr., Mar. 1973, at 132, 134 (argues that while creationism does not qualify
as a true scientific theory, neither does evolution, and that creationism should serve
as a model to explain the scientific beginnings of the universe); Minnery, Creationist
Tenacity Secures Subtle Shifts in Science Texts, Christianity Today, Nov. 7, 1980, at
64 (reviews attempt to prove legitimacy of creation-science for use in California
public schools); Moore, Evolution, Creation, and the Scientific Method, Am. Biology
Tchr., Jan. 1973, at 24, 26 (argues that creation-science, like evolution, is a valid
theory of the origins of life and can be used with other sciences to promote scientific
discovery).
7. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1666 (Supp. 1981); see V. Bates, Christian Fundamental-
ism and the Theory of Evolution in Public School Education: A Study of the Creation
Science Movement 44-45, 48-49 (1976) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of California at Davis, on file at the Fordham Law Review).
8. Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 Yale
L.J. 515, 537-38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Public School Science Instruction].
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balancing its treatment with creation-science.9 Creationists further
contend that creation-science, although consistent with Biblical
dogma, has secular educational value and, therefore, when taught in
public schools does not violate the establishment clause.' 0
Efforts by creationists and other religious organizations to institute
public school instruction in concepts that are consistent with religious
doctrines require a variant analysis under the first amendment reli-
gion clauses. Part I of this Project examines whether public school
presentation of academic material that is contrary to religious beliefs
does in fact infringe upon free exercise rights, and whether presenta-
tion of secularized religious concepts is an appropriate remedy. It
demonstrates that public school instruction in the theory of evolution
does not violate the free exercise clause. Part I concludes that the
state's interest in providing a general education outweighs religious
believers' interests in the classroom presentation of views consistent
with their faith. When a legislature or school board includes material
in public school curriculum that may have a religious nature, courts
must address whether such instruction will violate the prohibition
against governmental acts respecting the establishment of religion.
Part II suggests a new perspective on establishment clause analysis to
determine whether material proffered as secular academics will actu-
ally constitute religious instruction in violation of the establishment
clause.
I. PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Violations of the free exercise clause" are predicated upon a show-
ing of a conflict12 between a government action and a sincerely held
9. Public School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 550, 561; see Daniel v.
Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 1975); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1260-61 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 462 F. Supp.
725, 725 (D.D.C. 1978), affd, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Willoughby v. Stever,
No. 1574-72, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972), affd, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, slip
op. at 6 (Ind. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1977).
10. Public School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 551-70; Defendants' Pre-
liminary Outline of the Legal Issues and Proof at 2, McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1669(l) (Supp.
1981).
11. U.S. Const. amend. I. The first amendment free exercise clause forbids
Congress from making laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Id. The free
exercise clause has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
12. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (Amish beliefs in
conflict with secular interests in requiring compulsory education to age 16); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (beliefs of Seventh-Day Adventist as Sabbatari-
ans in conflict with state unemployment insurance requirements); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) (anti-polygamy law in conflict with reli-
gious beliefs in polygamy held by Mormons).
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belief' 3 central 14 to a bona fide religion' 5 which results in a burden ' 0
13. Courts generally will not pass on the sincerity of a belief. Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)
(dictum); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1943);
see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-11, at 859-62 (1978). Courts have
broadly construed what may constitute a valid religious belief. See United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185-88 (1965); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 571 (1945);
Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz.), appeal dismissed per curiam,
372 U.S. 228 (1963); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 706,
205 P. 49, 53 (1921); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 199, 351 N.E.2d 750, 761
(1976); cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (questions concerning the
truth or falsity of a defendant's religious beliefs or doctrines should not be submitted
to a jury because to do so may violate the free exercise clause: "[I]f those [religious]
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity,
then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain."). But see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (Court considered sincerity of Amish religious
objections to compulsory school attendance); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 718-
23, 394 P.2d 813, 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-74 (1964) (en bane) (court considered
sincerity of American Indian belief in religious use of peyote). See generally P.
Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 22-34 (1964). Of necessity, some limits must
be set because "[i]n a complex society where the requirements of public safety, health
and order must be recognized, those who seek immunity from these requirements on
religious grounds must at the very least demonstrate adherence to ethical standards
and a spiritual discipline." United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (D.D.C.
1968). In Kuch, the court found no violation of the free exercise clause because there
was no "solid evidence of a belief in a supreme being, a religious discipline, a ritual,
or tenets to guide one's daily existence." Id. at 444; see Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1417 (1967).
14. See, e.g., Romney v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890) (polygamy not
central to Mormon faith); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (same);
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (no proof that religious
beliefs required defendant to injest psychedelic drugs in contravention of state crimi-
nal laws); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 725, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 820, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69, 73, 76 (1964) (en bane) (peyote is the "sine qua non" of the practice of
the Native American Church); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super.
564, 584, 262 A.2d 21, 32 (N.J. Ch.) (program of religious readings prior to official
start of school day not central to the free exercise of religion), afJ'd per curlam, 57
N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). See generally L.
Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-11, at 862-65.
15. The term, a bona fide religion, has been liberally construed by the courts.
See, e.g., People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 211-12, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903) (court
recognized religion of Christian Catholic Church which believed in divine healing);
McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 1922) (court took notice of a
religion whose major belief was communication with departed spirits). In Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488. 495 (1961), the Supreme Court reiterated the prohibitions of
state discrimination among religions and state preference of religion over non-reli-
gion, thereby recognizing and protecting both religion and non-religion. The Court,
in addition, expanded the definition of religion to include faiths not necessarily based
on a belief in a supreme being. Id. at 495 n.11; see L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-6. In
many instances, courts will not even address the question of whether a religion is
bona fide. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944);
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1968) (dictum); In re Jenison,
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on the practice of that religion.' 7 A governmental act burdens free
exercise when it has the effect of undermining religious beliefs or
inhibiting religious practice.' For a burden to invoke constitutional
protection of free exercise, it must be caused by a coercive act or
267 Minn. 136, 136-37, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589-90 (1963). Further proof of the
protection by the courts of the freedom of religious choice lies in their hesitancy to
leave decisions as to what consitutes religion to the state's discretion. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940).
16. Courts have imposed a strict standing requirement on free exercise claims. A
claimant lacks standing unless he is burdened in his religious practice. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9
(1963); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1316 n.20 (D.N.J. 1977), a]f'd per
curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979): Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1293-94
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 806 (1974). Thus, an incorporated store, when
prohibited by statute from doing business on Sunday, has no standing to raise a free
exercise claim because a corporation has no free exercise rights. Two Guys v. McGin-
ley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961). Nor can a taxpayer assert a free exercise claim to
challenge the use of state funds to purchase textbooks to be lent to parochial school
students. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (burden is too tenuous
or nonexistent, and no coercion is present).
17. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1972) (compulsory
public school attendance burdened crucial community religious instruction); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (required availability for Saturday employ-
ment burdened belief in religious observance of Saturday as day of worship); People
v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 717, 394 P.2d 813, 815. 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (1964) (en
banc) (law banning use of peyote prevented Indians from using it as part of religious
ritual and thereby burdened them in their sectarian practice). The Supreme Court
has noted that the free exercise clause "'secure[s] religious liberty in the individual by
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free
exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates
against him in the practice of his religion." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223 (1963); accord Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Jones v. Butz, 374 F.
Supp. 1284, 1293-94 (S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd ner., 419 U.S. 806 (1974); Reed v.
VanHoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 52 (W.D. Mich. 1965); State v. \Vhisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d
181, 204, 351 N.E.2d 750, 764 (1976); LeClercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public
Schools: A Second Consumption?, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 209, 226 (1974); see Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
can exact from the government.").
18. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 633 (1978) (Tennessee statute
barring ministers or priests from holding public office undermined minister's free
exercise rights as a candidate for delegate to Tennessee constitutional convention);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (New Hampshire statute requiring
license plate motto that was religiously offensive to appellees undermined religious
beliefs), Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1972) (state education law
requiring participation in ROTC exercises undermined student's religious opposition
to war); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774-75 (D. Ariz.) (forcing students to
stand for the singing of the National Anthem in public school undermined beliefs of
Jehovah's Witnesses), appeal dismissed per curiam, 372 U.S. 228 (1963); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 60, 74 (1964) (en banc)
(government ban on use of peyote undermined American Indian use of the drug as
part of religious ritual). In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Supreme
Court distinguished a direct burden on a religious practice from an indirect burden,
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program. 9 Coercion is the core requirement of any free exercise
holding that only a direct burden on the exercise of a religious belief would support a
free exercise claim. Id. at 606-07. See generally Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the
United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 217, 231-47 (1966) (discussing
the differences between direct and indirect burdens). A direct burden on religion is
present when the effect of a governmental act is to prohibit directly the performance
of acts that have religious import for the claimant. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940); cf. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696,
205 P. 49 (1921) (direct burden when compelled to commit religiously offensive act).
Indirect government burdens exist when the religious activity is not directly prohib-
ited, but some governmental act makes the religious practice more expensive or
inconvenient. Indirect burdens are not violative of free exercise unless the govern-
mental purpose can be achieved by less restrictive means. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961); P. Kauper, supra note 13, at 42-43; Galanter, supra, at 231-
39; see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971); Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 630-
31 (1961). Statutes, for example, requiring all commercial establishments to remain
closed on Sundays do not directly infringe on Sabbatarians' free exercise rights
because "the statute . . . does not make criminal the holding of any religious belief
or opinion, nor does it force anyone to embrace any religious belief or to say or
believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets." 366 U.S. at 603. However, "[l]f
the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is
to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect
of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden." Id. at 607. The Supreme Court has found
Sunday closing laws to be secular in purpose although their origins might have been
religious. Id. at 607-08. In addition, the Court concluded that no other effective
means could be implemented to achieve the state interest of a uniform day of rest. Id.
at 608-09; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-52 (1961). But see Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), in which religious colporteurs were discrimi-
nated against by a license tax applied uniformly to all who solicited. Although this
may appear to be an indirect burden, only making the plaintiffs religion more
expensive, the court found that the burden could be made to be so great as to
"deprive [the religion] of the resources necessary for its maintenance." Id. at 112.
The dissent, however, argued that all regulations, in varying degrees, prohibit the
free exercise of religion, but that does not justify abridging the powers of taxation and
regulation. Id. at 130 (Reed, J., dissenting).
19. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 200, 351 N.E.2d 750,
762 (1976); see, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 449-51 (1938) (ordi-
nance requiring prior written permission of the city manager to distribute literature
coercively burdened Jehovah's Witnesses whose beliefs included dissemination of
written religious dogma); Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y.) (state
provisions requiring particular method of animal slaughter for health reasons did not
create a coercive burden on those who were religiously opposed to use of such
methods), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 806 (1974); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 35-
36, 100 A.2d 857, 859 (1953) (coercion created by distribution of "majority's" Bible
in public schools), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954). In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952), children were permitted to attend religious instruction classes as part of a
release time program held off school premises. Suit was brought, in part based on a
[Vol. 501118
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claim.2 0  A governmental action is a coercive burden on religious
practice when it forces an individual either to abandon a religious
practice to avoid suffering any penalty,21 or to choose between a
religious practice and a public benefit .2 -  Finally, the burden on
free exercise claim, but the Court found no coercion, stating "[lit takes obtuse
reasoning to inject any issue of the 'free exercise' of religion into [this] case. No one is
forced to go to the religious classroom and no religious exercise or instruction is
brought to the classrooms of the public schools .... There is no evidence in the
record before us that supports [the] conclusion [of coercion] .... If in fact coercion
were used, if it were established that any one or more teachers were using their office
to persuade or force students to take the religious instruction, a wholly different case
would be presented." Id. at 311 (footnotes omitted). Substantial economic harm has
not been found to constitute coercion or to create the requisite burden. See Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 630 (1961) (Sabbatarians not burdened
by Sunday closing laws); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (same).
20. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963): see Jones v. Butz, 374 F.
Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 806 (1974); State Bd. of Educ. v.
Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 584, 262 A.2d 21, 32, af'd per curiam, 57 N.J.
172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). The religious practice
of the claimant must in some way be limited. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (taxation for programs contrary to religious beliefs does not
constitute coercion); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238, 248-49 (1968) (no
coercion present when state loaned textbooks free of charge to all students in grades
seven through twelve in public and parochial schools); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 602-03, 605 (1961) (Sunday closing laws do not constitute coercion of Sabbatar-
ian practices); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 414, 289 A.2d
914, 923 (Ct. C.P. 1971) (secular curriculum does not create the requisite coercion
for a constitutional violation: "The court cannot assume that any religious activities
seep into or permeate the secular purposes of the curriculum. Since the plaintiffs are
unable satisfactorily to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of
religious beliefs, there can be no violation of the free exercise clause."), appeal
dismissed, 165 Conn. 792, 305 A.2d 536 (1973).
21. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state statute forced Amish parents
to send their children to school until age 16 despite religious objections or suffer a
criminal penalty); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormons forced to
surrender practice of polygamy to avoid criminal penalties); United States v. Hender-
son, 180 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.) (defendant convicted for not registering under Selective
Service Act because of religious objections to war), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (en banc)
(American Indians who used peyote in religious ritual were required by statute to
abandon use or incur criminal penalty); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d
588 (1963) (juror was held guilty of contempt for refusing to serve on jury because of
religious beliefs).
22. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 626 (1978) (Baptist minister forced to choose between remaining in the clergy or
holding public office barred to clergymen); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489
(1961) (candidate for public office would be unable to become a notary public if he
refused to take an oath declaring a belief in God); Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61, 64 (1946) (no state interest justifying denial of benefit of citizenship to alien
who refused for religious reasons to swear to defend the country): Spence v. Bailey,
465 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1972) (student had to choose between attending a public
secondary school's ROTC class or observing his anti-war religious principles, thereby
risking expulsion). See generally Galanter, supra note 18, at 220-21 (conditioning
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religious practice must outweigh the state's interest in imposing the
burden .23
Creationists believe that the theory of evolution cannot be recon-
ciled with a literal reading of the Biblical account of creation.2 4 The
theory of evolution asserts that life evolved from simple to complex
and greatly diversified forms over billions of years.25 Creationists
believe that the varied forms of life on earth were instantaneously
created by a deity in the relatively recent past.2 6 These theories of the
public office on the performance of certain religious practice is forbidden). In Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court considered the claim of a
woman discharged from her job as a textile worker because her religious beliefs
forbade her from working on Saturdays. Id. at 399. She was found by the state to be
ineligible for unemployment benefits solely because she failed to accept employment
requiring Saturday attendance. Id. at 399-401. The Court found the state's policy to
be coercive because the appellant was forced to "choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Govern-
mental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship." Id. at 404.
23. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972) (state interest in
requiring Amish to attend school through age 16 not compelling); People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 727-28, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964) (en bane)
(state interest in regulating drug use of American Indians who used peyote as part of
religious ritual not compelling); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588,
589-90 (1963) (state interest in promoting effective jury system not greater than
individual's religious objections to serving on a jury); see McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 462-63 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion); LeClercq, supra note 17, at
227.
24. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Ark.
1982). Creationists believe in spontaneous creation, adhering to the Biblical principle
that "only the fact that like begets like is supported by observation. So evolution is
either outside science or contrary to it." Armstrong, On the Distinction Between
Religion, Philosophy, Science, and History, in 11 Creation Research Soc'y Q. 10, 12
(June 1974). The history of the creation-science movement began with the advent of
fundamentalism. Bates, supra note 7, at 6. Fundamentalism arose with the organiza-
tion of the Niagara Bible conference in 1870. Id. at 9. This group was formed in
response to Darwinism and Biblical criticism. Id. at 7-9. Five points of fundamental-
ism were developed at the conference: "1.) The innerrancy [sic] or infallibility of the
Bible; 2.) The divinity of Jesus Christ; 3.) The virgin birth of Jesus Christ; 4.) The
substitutionary atonement of Christ; and 5.) The physical resurrection of Christ and
his eventual second coming." Id. at 10. Fundamentalists employed power plays,
legislative influence, local pressure and propaganda to garner support for the literal
interpretation of the Bible. Id. at 23-25. Organizations were formed in the 1960's to
provide a forum for creationism. Id. at 54, 56. Fundamentalists consider that the
theory of evolution is a threat to various aspects of their lives. Id. at 70-78. The goals
of the fundamentalists include the attainment of "scientific legitimacy" and "equality
for the creation model in public schools and . . . textbooks." Id. at 105.
25. C. Darwin, The Origin of Species passim (Harvard Univ. Press 1966).
26. See Public School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 520.
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origins and development of life are clearly contradictory.2, This
conflict is transformed, creationists contend, into a coercive burden
on religious practice when evolution is taught in public schools.
Creationists argue that schools are innately coercive, and that manda-
tory attendance and required coursework undermine religious beliefs
by fostering belief in material that conflicts with their religious ten-
ets.29-  Students, creationists reason, must either listen to exclusive
27. A leading creationist textbook guide for teachers has outlined the theoretical
differences between creationism and evolution:
Basic Predictions of
Evolution Model Creation Model
Structure of Natural Law
Galactic Universe
Structure of Stars
Other Heavenly Bodies
Types of Rock Formations
Appearance of Life
Array of Organisms
Appearance of Kinds
of Life
Mutations in Organisms
Natural Selection
Age of Earth
Fossil Record
Appearance of Man
Nature of Man
Origin of Civilization
Constantly Changing
Galaxies Changing
Stars Changing into
Other Types
Building Up
Different in Different
..Ages"
Life Evol\ing from Non-Life
Continuum of Organisms
New Kinds Appearing
Beneficial
Creative Process
Extremely Old
Innumerable Transitions
Ape-Human Intermediates
Quantitatively Superior
to Animals
Slow and Gradual
Invariable
Galaxies Constant
Stars Unchanged
Breaking Down
Similar in All -Ages"
Life Onl\ from Life
Distinct Kinds of Organisms
No New Kinds Appearing
Harmful
Conservative Process
Probably Young
Systematic Caps
No Ape-Human Intermediates
Qualitatively Distinct From
Animals
Contemporaneous with Man
Institute for Creation Research, Scientific Creationism 13 (H. Morris Public School
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Scientific Creationism -Public School Edition).
28. Public School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 518, 537-38; e.g., McLean
v. Arkansas Bd. of Edue., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1256-57 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (defendants
claimed that to teach evolution exclusively would violate their free exercise rights);
Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972) (plaintiffs
claimed that textbooks containing evolution as the only credible theory of origins
violated their free exercise rights), aff]'d mern., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp.
1208, 1209 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (plaintiffs claimed that the teaching of evolution vio-
lated the religion clauses), aJ'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
29. See Public School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 523. A leading cre-
ationist legal advocate, Wendell Bird, author of this student note, published in the
Yale Law Journal, argued that coercion is present in public schools because of
"prescribed courses, conditioned benefits, teacher influence, and peer group persua-
sion, or the susceptibility of students to these pressures against religious imperatives."
Id. at 528. Bird also co-authored a Model Act for requiring public schools to give
balanced treatment to creation-science and evolution, and has served as staff counsel
for the San Diego-based Institute for Creation Research. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of
Category
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discussions of evolution or forego the benefit of public education.30
To remedy the alleged burdensome effect of presentation of evolution,
creationists propose that creation-science be taught. 3'
Creationists have relied on Wisconsin v. Yoder 32 to support their
contention that simply teaching material that conflicts with religious
belief can be coercive. 33 The Supreme Court in Yoder found a state
penal law requiring school attendance for all children until age sixteen
to be coercive on the religious practices of the Amish sect. 34  The
Court looked to the long existence of the Amish 3 and the sincerity of
their beliefs and ideology 36 before upholding their claim. The Court
concluded that the education of children at home in the Amish com-
munity was basic to the religious practice of the sect, and necessary for
the survival and perpetuation of the Amish faith. 37  Although the
Court acknowledged the state's interest in providing a minimum
standard for education of its citizenry, it held that this interest did not
justify the burden placed on Amish religious practices. 38
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 & n.11 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Specifically addressing
Bird's note, the McLean court stated: "The argument has no legal merit." Id. at
1274.
30. 529 F. Supp. at 530-31; see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
31. Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 1975); McLean v. Arkansas
Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260-61 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Wright v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Hendren v. Campbell,
No. S577-0139, slip op. at 4-10 (Ind. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1977); Public School Science
Instruction, supra note 8, at 550, 561; see Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 462 F.
Supp. 725, 726 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
32. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33. See Public School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 524. Some creationists
claim that similar to the Amish, their practices require them to be separate from
educational material which conflicts with belief. These separatist beliefs are violated
by the nature of compulsory education, which forces the student to listen to reli-
giously offensive views. Id. at 524-25.
34. 406 U.S. at 218-19.
35. Id. at 209-10, 235. The Amish and their cultural ancestors have been in
existence for three centuries. Id. at 235.
36. Id. at 235. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69 (1964) (en banc), in which the California Supreme Court exempted Indians of the
Native American Church from criminal bans on the use of peyote. Id. at 726, 394
P.2d 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 76-77. In arriving at its decision, the court considered the
sincere religious belief of the Indians and its centrality to a bona fide religion, the
long history of peyote use as an object of worship among the Indians, and the
unlikelihood of drug abuse. Id. at 718-23, 394 P.2d at 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-74.
37. 406 U.S. at 211, 217.
38. Id. at 221-29, 234-36. In some cases, the secular governmental interest sought
to be furthered is found to be less substantial and riot compelling when balanced
against the actual burden on free exercise. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 519-20
(1946) (although government aim of protecting citizens from solicitations applied to
all peddlers, not just religious colporteurs, such a goal had to be subordinated to first
amendment right of religious freedom); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302,
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A review of judicial treatment of the free exercise clause clearly
indicates that public school presentation of educational material that
conflicts with a religious belief constitutes an insufficient burden on
307 (1940) (despite desire to protect the public against fraud, a selective licensing
process as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses was invalid); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F.
Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz.) (although there existed a state interest in the advancement
of nationalism, it could not outweigh the religious beliefs of those opposed to stand-
ing for the singing of the National Anthem), appeal disinssed per curiam, 372 U.S.
228 (1963); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 713-14, 205 P.
49, 52 (1921) (court invalidated certain dancing curriculum as violative of petition-
ers' free exercise rights despite "reasonableness" of legislation); State v. \Vhisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181, 204-05, 351 N.E.2d 750, 764-65 (1976) (state interest in guarantee-
ing quality education subordinated to rights of parents to send their children to a
nonpublic religious school). Courts have repeatedly found that when a governmental
act or program severely infringes free exercise of religion, a less oppressive means of
accomplishing the state objective is mandated. For example: (1) A state cannot
prohibit, limit or require a license for the distribution of religious pamphlets, Follett
v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (state cannot tax the right to distribute
religious literature); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (ordinance
requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to procure a license to solicit orders for religious
merchandise unconstitutional); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943)
(same: "A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Federal Constitution."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (state
officials could not require a confirmation that a religious group was truly religious as
a prerequisite to granting a license to solicit); see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
716-17 (1977); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1961); Pitts v. Knowles,
339 F. Supp. 1183, 1184, 1186 (W.D. Wis. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.
1973); but cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-78 (1941) (license require-
ment as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses for a public parade upheld on reasonableness
of state interests); (2) localities are forbidden from denying the use of public grounds
for religious sermons or services to some religious groups but not others, Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-
73 (1951); (3) a state cannot mandate that an individual display a motto that
contradicts religious beliefs on vehicular license plates, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 717 (1977) ("Live Free or Die"); and (4) a state cannot prohibit members of the
clergy from holding public office. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978). In
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the state interest in limiting eligibility for
unemployment benefits to individuals who cannot find any work did not warrant
exclusion of individuals who are constrained to accept work because of Saturday
Sabbath worship. Id. at 406-09. The government alleged that no alternative means
other than to deprive all who could not work for religious reasons could be found for
implementing unemployment insurance without giving rise to spurious claims. Id.
The Sherbert Court held that no compelling government interest could justify condi-
tioning the receipt of the benefit on the abandonment of religious beliefs. There was
no indication that permitting an exception for appellant would encourage spurious
claims. Id. The decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), provides an
interesting contrast to Sherbert. Appellants in Braunfeld contended that due to the
enforcement of a Sunday closing statute, "[they would] suffer substantial economic
loss, to the benefit of their non-Sabbatarian competitors, if [they] also continue[d]
their Sabbath observance by closing their businesses on Saturday; that this result
[would] either compel appellants to give up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet
of the Orthodox Jewish faith, or [would] put appellants at a serious economic
disadvantage if they continue[d] to adhere to their Sabbath." Id. at 602. Implict in
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religious practice to invoke constitutional protection. Furthermore,
any burden that might exist is outweighed by the state's interest in
disseminating educational material.
A. Public Schools and Free Exercise Burdens
The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment does not
obligate the government to protect an individual from knowledge or
views that contradict a religious belief. 39 Lower courts have held that
when the government itself disseminates knowledge that may be con-
trary to a religious belief, the free exercise of religion is not
abridged. 40 Thus, courts have refused to enjoin the public school use
of textbooks that include a discussion of evolution, 41 the federal fund-
ing of a series of science textbooks that focus on evolution, 42 and the
presentation of a display about evolution by a government-funded
public museum. 43
More specifically, when government dissemination of knowledge
occurs in the form of public school instruction, the presentation of
the Braunfeld opinion is that such a burden was indirect and did not override the
states' compelling state interest in a uniform day of rest. Id. at 613-16 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Sherbert, no compelling state interest was found to justify the in-
fringement. Commentators have found Braunfeld to be inconsistent with the holding
of Sherbert and argue that Braunfeld should be overruled. Kurland, The Supreme
Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W.
Va. L. Rev. 213, 244 (1973); L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-10, at 854-55; see Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring) (burden in Braun-
feld is as onerous as in Sherbert).
39. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Supreme Court stated that
"the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from [distaste-
ful] views." Id. at 107 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505
(1952)).
40. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 462 F. Supp. 725, 726-28 (D.D.C. 1978), aJJ'd,
636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 96
(S.D.W. Va.), aff'd mern., 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp.
395, 405 (D.N.H. 1974); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208,
1210-12 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72, slip op. at 3-6
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972), aff'd memn., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975).
41. Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 96-97 (S.D.W. Va.), ajf'd
mem., 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F.
Supp. 1208, 1210-12 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72, slip.
op. at 3-6 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972), af'd mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
42. Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972),
aff'd, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); see Hendren
v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, slip op. at 18-21 (Ind. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1977).
43. Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 462 F. Supp. 725, 728 (D.D.C. 1978), aJJ'd.
636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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ideas that contradict a religious belief is not transformed into a burden
on free exercise. 44 In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,4 5
for example, Jehovah Witnesses challenged a state statute that re-
quired student recital of the pledge of allegiance. The Supreme Court
held that mandatory loyalty oaths impermissibly compelled a state-
ment of belief in violation of students' first amendment rights.40 Nev-
ertheless, the Court distinguished and advocated public school in-
struction in the ideals of loyalty and patriotism.4 7 Similarly, a state
supreme court, upholding instruction in a state college of a Bible study
course challenged as antithetical to a literal belief in the Bible, de-
clared that the religion clauses "'do not proscribe open, free, critical,
and scholarly examination of the literature, experiences, and knowl-
edge of mankind."' 48 The Supreme Court's decision in Yoder is con-
sistent with this proposition. Compulsory education was found bur-
densome in Yoder not because Amish children were exposed to
educational subject matter incongruous with their beliefs, but because
44. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 148 (E.D. Tenn. 1979): Williams v.
Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 96 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd mere., 530 F.2d 972 (4th
Cir. 1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 401-02 (D.N.H. 1974): %%'right v.
Houston Indep. School Dist.. 366 F. Supp. 1208. 1212 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff d per
curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 969 (1974): Willoughby
v. Stever, No. 1574-72, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972), aff'd inc., 504 F.2d
271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975): Cornwell v. State Bd. of
Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 342-44 (D. Md. 1969), affd. 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397,
414, 289 A.2d 914, 923 (Ct. C.P. 1971).
45. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
46. Id. at 642.
47. Id. at 631, 640. See generally P. Kauper, supra note 13, at 15, 92 (Barnette
described as extreme situation in which student physically compelled to perform an
offensive act).
48. Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 Wash. 2d 912,
919, 436 P.2d 189, 193 (1967), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 960 (1968). The court further
stated that if all school curriculum was conformed to religious views, 'man' fields of
scholarship-anthropology, zoology, the theory of evolution ... would have to be
removed from our university. It might be said that the objective examination of these
theories conflicts with the religious beliefs of certain persons entertaining contrary
beliefs based upon their religious convictions .... The result advocated . . . would
be catastrophic .... Would plaintiffs have us strike the words of Milton, Dante,
and the other ancient authors whose writings have survived the ages, because the\
wrote of religious theories with which plaintiffs quarrel?" Id. at 919-20, 436 P.2d at
193. Inevitably some academic material taught in the schools will conflict with
deeply felt religious beliefs. Courts have held that despite this conflict '[t]eachers of
science in the public schools should not be expected to avoid the discussion of every
scientific issue on which some religion claims expertise." %Vright v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiamn, 486 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974): accord Cornwell v. State Bd.
of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969) (sex education courses approved by the
court despite their offensiveness to some religious groups), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
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the separation of Amish children from the Amish community during
the last two years of compulsory education prevented them from
receiving necessary training in their religious way of life. 49 The free
exercise violation was grounded in Amish separatist practices and the
requested remedy was exemption from school attendance as a whole,
not alteration of particular school curriculum. 50
The state is not required to eliminate from its curriculum ideas that
may persuade a student not to adopt a certain religious view. For
example, the Yoder Court found that the Amish objected to the state's
secondary education program because it "tend[ed] to develop values
they reject as influences that alienate man from God." 5' The Court
did not, however, find that the free exercise clause prohibited a state
program that would compete with religious objectives.5 2 It held only
that, in the absence of a sufficient state interest, the Constitution
required the state to exempt a religious believer who because of re-
quired school attendance would be unable to practice his religion.5 3
B. State Interest in Dissemination of Knowledge
and Limits on Free Exercise Protection
In a pluralistic society in which government policies promoting
social order inevitably clash with some of its more than one thousand
belief systems,5 4 the right to practice religious dictates is, of necessity,
limited. 55  Claimed violations of free exercise rights must, therefore,
49. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). Furthermore, the Amish were
willing to permit their children to attend school to the age of fourteen without any
exemptions or course modifications. Id. at 212.
50. The Court found that "the values and programs of the modern secondary
school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the
Amish religion." Id. at 217. Amish training of their own children fulfilled the goals of
public education by preparing children to live in their own community. Id. at 212,
222-29.
51. Id. at 212.
52. See id. at 234-36.
53. Id. at 235.
54. A directory of religious bodies in the United States has listed over 1,200
primary religious groups. J. Melton, A Directory of Religious Bodies in the United
States 1 (1977); see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (Court took
judicial notice of the fact that there are over 300 denominations in the United States).
A primary religious group is defined in the directory as one that (1) claims the
exclusive or primary religious affiliation of its members; (2) has at least two congre-
gations or groups in which members meet for worship, instruction or fellowship or, If
it has only one congregation, has 2,000 members; and (3) has a membership that
crosses a state line or extends beyond a metropolitan area. J. Melton, supra, at 17. See
generally J. Melton, The Encyclopedia of American Religions (1978).
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Distinctions have been made
between belief and practice. Although practice may be proscribed when confronted
with a compelling state interest, the freedom to hold religious beliefs is inviolable and
may never be restricted. Additionally, the right to adhere to the dictates of one's
conscience has been safeguarded along with the right to believe. See, e.g., School
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withstand close scrutiny by the courts.56 Although the Supreme
Court has stated that first amendment rights are in "a preferred
position, '"O the free exercise guarantees are not absolute.ss
Burdens on free exercise may be justified by countervailing state
interests.5 9 For example, the states' interests in controlling child labor
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1878); Giannella, supra note 13, at 1387-88. The individual, above
all, must be permitted the freedom of religious choice. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); State Bd.
of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 583, 262 A.2d 21, 31 (N.J. Ch.),
aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
56. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 (1978), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 606 (1961); see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943).
57. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
58. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947); Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943), id. at 643-44 (Black,
Douglas, JJ., concurring); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Hamil-
ton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934); Romney v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 715
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp.
439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696,
705, 205 P. 49, 52 (1921); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201,210-11, 68 N.E. 243, 246
(1903); McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 568-69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1922). The
Framers of the Constitution were also aware that the guarantee of religious practice
cannot be absolute, as is the protection of religious belief. Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, app. at 63-65 (1947) (J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments); L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-3, at 816-19.
59. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1961) (inter-
est in maintaining a uniform day of rest); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1961) (same); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 44445 (1961) (same), In re
Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 573 (1945) (interest in requiring adherence to state constitu-
tion by attorneys admitted in state); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944) (interest in enforcing child labor laws); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
574-76 (1941) (interest in maintaining public order); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 302 (1940) (interest in protecting the public from fraud); People v. Pierson,
176 N.Y. 201, 210-12, 68 N.E. 243, 246-47 (1903) (despite defendant's belief in divine
healing, the court upheld the state's interest in protecting the lives and health of
children); McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 1922) (interest in
protecting the public from fraud); cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 717, 394
P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964) (no compelling state interest in forbidding
American Indians from using peyote as part of religious practice). Courts are also
wary of the possibility of frivolous claims. In United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439
(D.D.C. 1968), the court considered the free exercise claim of members of the Neo-
American Church who were denied the use of LSD as part of religious ritual. Id. at
444-45. The religion's motto, "Victory over Horseshit!," and their emblem, a three-
eyed toad, were imprinted on T-shirts and religious paraphenalia. Id. at 445. The
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abuse have been found to outweigh the religious practice of pamphle-
teering by children .60 A state's interests in protecting its citizens from
drug abuse have been found to override a religious sect's use of hallu-
cinogenic drugs as an integral part of its religious ritual.0' National
defense interests, inherent in military conscription laws, have been
found to justify less than absolute protection of those who object to
war on religious grounds.A2
The Supreme Court has stated that "[p]roviding public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State." 63 The primary
court concluded that there was "little evidence ...to support the view that the
Church and its members as a body [were] motivated by or associated because of any
common religious concern." Id. at 444.
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-71 (1944) (state interest in limit-
ing child labor outweighed parental interest in child distributing religious literature).
61. See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, '446-47 (D.D.C. 1968) (state
interests in controlling drug abuse outweighed a "cult-type" group's interest in use of
hallucinogenic drugs). But cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813,
821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964) (en bane) (use of peyote upheld because central to
religious belief).
62. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971); accord Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 385 (1974) (compelling state interest in maintaining armies
supported denial of veterans' benefits to religious conscientious objector); United
States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir.) (state interest in maintaining
armies supported penalty under Selective Service Act for failing to register despite
religious objections enforced), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); c]. In re Summers,
325 U.S. 561, 571-73 (1945) (upheld denial of bar admission to Illinois applicant
because he was unwilling to swear to uphold the state constitution containing duty to
serve state militia in time of war); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S.
245, 260-61, 263-65 (1934) (mandatory state university course in military science
upheld due to a compelling state interest in training a citizen militia despite student's
religious opposition to war). But see Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64
(1946) (denial of citizenship to aliens who refuse to swear to defend the country not
justified by state interest in national defense). A criminal prosecution under an Act of
Congress that forbade the practice of polygamy in territories of the United States
generated the Supreme Court's earliest, extensive treatment of the limits of the first
amendment's guarantee of religious liberty. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878). In Reynolds, the Mormon Church asserted that polygamy was an encouraged
practice of the Mormon religious faith and state proscription or regulation of that
practice burdened its religious liberty. Id. at 161. The Court declared that although
religious belief is absolutely protected, Congress has the power to abridge actions that
are "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. at 164; accord
Romney v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44-46 (1890) (Congress repealed the incorpora-
tion of the Mormon Church because of Mormons' belief in polygamy); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890) (defendant refused the right to vote because of his
belief in polygamy: "[[]t does not follow that everything which may be so called
[religion] can be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what
any particular sect may designate as religion.").
63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); see Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of
Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 411-16, 289 A.2d 914, 922-24 (Ct. C.P. 1971) (a free
exercise based challenge to offensive health education course that taught, in part,
that "life comes from life" was denied because of the state's secular interests in
education); Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to
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purpose of public education is to impart to children a general fund of
knowledge with which they can participate in an often complex soci-
ety. 4 The state, therefore, has an interest in providing knowledge
developed by a responsible academic community, 5 irrespective of
whether the material is inconsistent with religious dogma." Simi-
Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 871,
902-03 (1977) (unless claims for exemption are based on religious interests of the
degree advanced in Yoder, secular interests in education remain paramount);
Kurland, supra note 38, at 213-14 (the Yoder decision was not supported by prece-
dent and the result was effectively to destroy state neutrality toward religion; state
interests in education should have prevailed); Special Project, Education and the
Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1373, 1440 (1976) ("In
the cases that challenge the general curriculum, courses, or books, parents have
sought protection, under the guise of free exercise . . . . In response, courts have
expressed an overriding concern that the personal attitudes and values of individual
parents must not be allowed to stifle the free interchange of ideas in public school
classrooms needed to achieve the educational system's goals.").
64. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304-06 (7th
Cir. 1980) (the acquisition of knowledge in the classroom is entitled to constitutional
protection); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972) (the "principal function of all elementary and secondary education
is indoctrinative-whether it be to teach the ABC's or multiplication tables or to
transmit the basic values of the community"); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387,
1392 (D. Mass.) ("members of the community usually expect the secondary school to
concentrate on transmitting basic information, teaching 'the best that is known and
thought in the world;' training by established techniques, and, to some extent at
least, indoctrinating in the mores of the surrounding society"), af'd per curiam, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250 (1957); Davis v. Page,
385 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.N.H. 1974); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355
(M.D. Ala. 1970); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 54344, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (1949);
Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 \Wash. 2d 912, 919-20,
436 P.2d 189, 193 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960 (1968); Hirschoff, supra note 63,
at 878, 880-82; Special Project, supra note 63, at 1384-85. The Supreme Court has
recognized "the right to acquire useful information" as a constitutionally protected
right. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
65. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969); Sterzing v. Fort
Bend Indep. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 661-62 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on
remedial grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Webb v. Lake Mills Comm. School
Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 804-05 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp.
1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Parducci v.
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355-57 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
66. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1968); Zykan v. Warsaw Com-
munity School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 1980); see Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The government interest in disseminating
knowledge will outveigh free exercise claims based on assertions that the material
conflicts with religious belief, provided the subject matter is neutral and is presented
in a neutral way. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952); see Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); School Dist. v. Schempp,
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larly, the state has an interest in maintaining the smooth operation of
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Crowley v. Smithsonian
Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 490
(6th Cir. 1975); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334-35 (6th Cir.
1970); DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836, 839 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284,
1312 (D.N.J. 1977), af'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Hopkins v.
Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 414, 289 A.2d 914, 923 (Ct. C.P. 1971);
Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 51-52, 100 A.2d 857, 868 (1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 816 (1954); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 203-04, 351 N.E.2d 750,
764 (1976). See generally P. Kauper, supra note 13, at 64-67 (neutrality required by
the government). The first amendment requirement of neutrality in public school
education protects the free exercise rights of all students. See Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment leaves the
Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality .... The
philosophy is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will be a divisive
force. The First Amendment teaches that a government netural in the field of
religion better serves all religious interests."); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48,
51 (W.D. Mich. 1965) ("[T]he First Amendment insures to parents the security that
children attending public elementary schools are not officially taught the tenets of a
religion other than that of the parents. This insurance is a protection to both the
majority and the minority, and it is an essential safeguard to the protection and free
exercise of religion."); W. Katz, Religion and American Constitutions 22-30 (1964)
(government must remain neutral); L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-4, at 822-23
(neutrality is a flexible theory designed to avoid absolute standards); Katz, Religious
Studies in State Universities, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 298-303 (1966) (learning institu-
tions must remain neutral). Neutrality is achieved by: (1) neither compelling nor
prohibiting belief in any educational material or religion, Ring v. Board of Educ.,
245 Ill. 334, 346-48, 92 N.E. 251, 252 (1910) ("One does not enjoy the free exercise of
religious worship who is compelled to join in any form of religious worship."); see
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61, 68-70 (1946); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), (2) prohibiting require-
ments that force students to declare or foresake their religious beliefs in the class-
room, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (Black,
Douglas, JJ., concurring) ("Words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty to
nothing but self-interest."); see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 209-10 (1948) (religious instruction on public school premises had the effect of
forcing students to declare their beliefs), (3) neither favoring one religion over
another nor showing a preference for religion over non-religion, Committee for
Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89 (1973); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67, 70 (1953); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Brown v.
Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960), aff'd, 155 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1963)-courts have prevented the intrusion of
religious doctrine into the schoolroom when it has the effect of exaggerating sectarian
differences through psychological pressure or self-consciousness, Illinois ex rel McCol-
lum v. Board of Edue., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Special Project, supra note 63, at 1428; see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441-42
(1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 339-40, 92
N.E. 251, 252 (1910)-and (4) neither advancing nor inhibiting religion. Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963); see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d
485, 490 (6th Cir. 1975). The first amendment forbids "the preference of a religious
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its schools. 67  Required attendance and various classroom rituals, such
as periodic examinations and class participation, serve only to further
these state interests. 68
Modification of school curriculum to "neutralize" material found
religiously offensive by some students is unprecedented as a remedy
for free exercise burdens.69  Even the less extreme remedy of exempt-
ing a student from religiously offensive school requirements has been
infrequently granted, and only in situations in which the state's inter-
est in the challenged requirement is minimal and exemption will not
disrupt the educational process. Notably, cases in which requested
exemptions have been allowed involved free exercise challenges to the
requirements of physical education courses.70  Students in one case
had been forced to attend ROTC military training sessions as part of
high school gym classes, despite religious objections. 1
In another case, students had been required to wear gymnastic ap-
parel that was, according to their student's religious beliefs, immoral
and sinful.72  In a third case, a student considered a dancing class to
doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular
dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd.
of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 411, 289 A.2d 914, 922 (Ct. C.P. 1971); see Williams
v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 96 (S.D.W. Va.), affid mein., 530 F.2d 972 (4th
Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has stressed, however, that absolute neutrality is not
feasible. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). In Walz, the
Court noted that "The course of constitutional neutrality ... cannot be an abso-
lutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of [the religion
clauses], which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none com-
manded, and none inhibited." 397 U.S. at 669; see L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-4, at
820-21; Katz, supra note 61, at 300-01.
67. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971);
Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 597-98 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948
(1971); BlackweU v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir.
1966); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 406 (D.N.H. 1974).
68. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
368 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
69. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (morning
readings of religious scriptures on school premises is forbidden despite free exercise
interests), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48,
51 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (same); cf. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction,
128 So. 2d 181, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (free distribution of King James Bible
in public schools violates free exercise and establishment clauses), aff'd per curiam,
155 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1963); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 48, 100 A.2d 857,
866 (1953) (same with Gideon Bible), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
70. See Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972); Mitchell v. McCall, 273
Ala. 604, 143 So. 2d 629 (1962); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App.
696, 205 P. 49 (1921).
71. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 798 (6th Cir. 1972).
72. Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 605, 143 So. 2d 629, 630 (1962).
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be religiously offensive, and sought to be excused.73  In all three
situations, a coercive burden was found and a limited exemption was
granted from the offending activity, not from the general require-
ments of physical education class.7 1
In the gym-class cases, the state's interest in requiring the chal-
lenged activity was found insufficient to justify coercing students to
perform physical acts repugnant to their religious scruples.7 - Teach-
ing the theory of evolution is distinguishable from these exemption
cases because science instruction is dissemination of knowledge, in
which the state has a substantial interest.76  An exemption from in-
struction in evolution would disrupt the education process and defeat
the state's interest in educating the complaining student. In Davis v.
Page,7 7 for example, a federal district court denied Apostolic Lutheran
parents' requests for exemptions for their children from all classes that
required students to participate in activities and to receive instruction
in material antithetical to religious beliefs.' The parents asserted
that their faith forbade viewing or listening to audio-visual projec-
tions, or listening to "worldly" music, and was in conflict with the
material in the mandatory health education course.79  The court
noted that "[t]he parents' right to freely exercise their religion and
their inherent right to control the upbringing of their children must be
weighed against the state's interest in providing its youth with a
proper and enabling education and the children's right to receive
it."' 0 The court concluded that the state's interests in education were
73. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 698-99, 205 P. 49,
49-50 (1921).
74. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1972); Mitchell v. McCall, 273
Ala. 604, 608, 143 So. 2d, 629, 632 (1962); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54
Cal. App. 696, 710-14, 205 P. 49, 54-56 (1921).
75. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text; cf. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F.
Supp. 766 (D. Ariz.) (student could not be forced to stand during the singing of the
National Anthem), appeal dismissed per curiam, 372 U.S. 228 (1963).
76. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
77. 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
78. Id. at 406.
79. Id. at 397. Plaintiffs contended that their beliefs, which included living a
Godly life and adhering to strict sex-role differences, was eroded by the public school
curriculum. Id. at 403. Generally, Apostolic Lutherans are opposed to material that
fosters humanism or communism, or encourages unisex behavior or the use of birth
control devices. Id. at 397, 403-04.
80. Id. at 399. Courts, when faced with public school first amendment claims,
will consider state interests in education. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Cornwell v. State Bd.
of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 342 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 52
(W.D. Mich. 1965); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 701,
205 P. 49, 50-51 (1921); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76
Wis. 177, 202, 44 N.W. 967, 976 (1980); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State
Neutrality, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 426, 438 (1953); Special Project, supra note 63, at
1433,
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paramount, that no alternative to the use of audio-visual equipment
was available and that "[t]o allow students and parents to pick and
choose which courses they want to attend would create a stratified
school structure, where division and derision would flourish. '"8'
Clearly the state's interest in requiring students to attend classes in
which the theory of evolution is discussed outweighs the student's
religious objection to the material. In Crowley v. Smithsonian Institu-
tion,8 2 the district court found that the government interest in the
dissemination of knowledge outweighed the burden imposed on reli-
gious believers 3 who claimed that a museum exhibition on the theory
of evolution burdened their religious practice. 4 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court, in affirming, stated that "a balance was long
ago struck in favor of diffusion of knowledge based on responsible
scientific foundations, and against special constitutional protection of
religious believers from the competition generated by such knowledge
diffusion."8' 5 In reaching its decision, the circuit court expressly relied
upon and extended "authoritative decisions permitting public schools
to teach the facts and theories of evolution to children, who, unlike
appellant, are compelled by law, to come, look, and listen."" 6
81. 385 F. Supp. at 405.
82. 462 F. Supp. 725 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd. 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 727. Plaintiffs claimed that the exhibition depicting evolution forced
them to choose between observing their religious beliefs and enjoying the benefits of a
public exhibition. Id. In Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 694 (Miss. 1970), the court
upheld a student's claim that prohibiting the teaching of evolution deprived her of
the "necessary technical, scientific training required to engage in the profession or
business which depends upon scientific knowledge of anthropology and related sub-
jects." Id. at 694; cf. Williams v. Board of Educ.. 388 F. Supp. 93, 96 (S.D. W. Va.)
(challenge to textbooks that discussed evolution dismissed as not based on any consti-
tutional grounds), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975): Hopkins v. Hamden Bd.
of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 411-16, 289 A.2d 914, 922-24 (Ct. C.P. 1971) (health
education course teaching that "life comes from life" does not create any burden and
is in accordance with secular educational goals).
84. 462 F. Supp. at 726-28.
85. 636 F.2d 738, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
86. Id. Government mandates that forbid the teaching of evolution in the class-
room are unconstitutional. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968); Smith v.
State, 242 So. 2d 692, 698 (Miss. 1970): see Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 491 (6th
Cir. 1975) (Tennessee statute which required textbooks to state that evolution is not
scientific fact and to give balanced treatment to other theories, including biblical
creationism, violated establishment clause): McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529
F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (state statute mandating that instruction in
evolution be balanced with instruction in creation-science violated establishment
clause); Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 95-96 (S.D. \W. Va.) (to use
textbooks which plaintiffs contended promoted disbelief in a supreme being and
encouraged students to use profanities and to denigrate the Bible did not violate the
free exercise or establishment clauses), aff'd re., 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975):
Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-13 (S.D. Tex. 1972)
(no violation of religion clauses to include evolution in school curriculum and text-
books), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969
(1974): Willoughby v. Stever. No. 1574-72, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972)
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Creationists contend that the state's interest in teaching either biol-
ogy or, more specifically, evolution is not as great as the state's interest
in education in general. The state does, however, have a substantial
interest in being free from the compulsion to diverge from professional
standards of education whenever material is presented that might
contradict some religious belief. As Justice Jackson noted in his con-
currence in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,8 7 "[i]f we
are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any . . sects or
inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public educa-
tion in shreds."88  Balancing all material that offends a religious
group with teachings consistent with religious beliefs would not only
prove impracticable 9 and substantially disruptive of the educational
process, but would conform public school curriculum to religious
dictates, thus implicating the establishment clause.
II. PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
Creationists' efforts to inject creation-science into public school
curriculum have not been limited to seeking a judicial remedy to
alleged free exercise violations. Creationists have also petitioned cur-
(no coercion of taxpayer's religious exercise when government funded textbooks that
included evolution), af'd mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 411, 412-
13, 289 A.2d 914, 922, 924-25 (Ct. C.P. 1971) (court refused to enjoin the teaching of
a health education course that included evolution); cf. Moore v. Gaston County Bd.
of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (discharge of teacher for
discussing Darwinian theory in the classroom and questioning the literal interpreta-
tion of the Bible violated the establishment clause).
87. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
88. Id. at 235 (Jackson, J., concurring).
89. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(to require public education to cater to the beliefs of all its students would not only be
impracticable, but would "[jeopardize] the freedom of the public schools"); see
Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473, 476 (1879) ("[T]he power of each parent to decide
the question what studies the scholars should pursue, or what exercises they should
perform, would be a power of disorganizing the school, and practically rendering it
substantially useless. However judicious it may be to consult the wishes of parents,
the disintegrating principle of parental authority to prevent all classification and
destroy all system in any school, public or private, is unknown to the law."). To
ameliorate every disagreeable act would be impossible. Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala.
604, 608, 143 So. 2d 629, 632 (1962); Drinan, Religion, The Courts, and Public
Policy 3, 31 (1963); see Special Project, supra note 63, at 1381, 1431-32; cf. Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 180 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Religious
freedom . . . comes of hard-headed fixing of those limits by neutral authority with
an eye to the widest freedom to proselyte compatible with the freedom of those
subject to proselyting pressures."). Horace Mann, one of the earliest educator-philos-
ophers, discussed a kind of anarchy which might ensue were all religious groups to
seek accommodation of their viewpoints in the school system. H. Mann, The Repub-
lic and the School, Horace Mann on the Education of Free Men 108-09 (L. Cremin
ed. 1957).
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riculum committees and state legislatures. 90 In Arkansas and Louisi-
ana, their activities have led to the enactment of statutes mandating
balanced treatment of evolution with creation-science.' These stat-
utes have in turn been challenged as government establishment of
religion.92
In McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education ,3 a federal district
court addressed the constitutionality of the Balanced Treatment for
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act.9 4 Public school treat-
ment of creation-science is facilitated by use of textbooks,95 designed
90. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1261-63 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Seagraves v. California, No. 278978, slip op. at 4 (Sacramento Super. Ct. Cal.
Mar. 6, 1981); Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, slip op. at 1-2 (Super. Ct. Ind.
Apr. 14, 1977); Public Funds For Textbooks Presenting Evolutionary Theory Of
Origin Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First Amendment, 58 Op. Att'y Gen.
262, 262 (Cal. 1975); Balanced Treatment for Scientific Creationism and Evolution
Act, Op. Att'y Gen. at 1-2 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979).
91. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 80-1663 to -1669 (Supp. 1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. art.
17:286.1 to :286.7 (West Supp. 1982).
92. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(challenge to Arkansas statute), Aguillard v. Louisiana, No. 81-4787 (E.D. La. filed
Dec. 3, 1981) (challenge to Louisiana statute, stayed pending resolution of an action
brought by creationists to enforce the statute, Keith v. Louisiana Dept. of Educ., No.
81-989 (M.D. La. filed Dec. 2, 1981)). The establishment clause provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const.
amend. I. Courts have interpreted the establishment clause in light of its historical
background. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681-87 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-36 (1962): McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 437-40 (1961); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 244-48 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 8-16 (1946). One commentator has also sought insight through historical analysis.
See generally Hitchcock, The Supreme Court And Religion: Historical Overview and
Future Prognosis, 24 St. Louis U. L.J. 183 (1980) (division of the judicial history of
the first amendment into four periods). It has been suggested that three schools of
thought were influential in shaping the establishment clause: (1) the evangelical
view, which considered separation of church and state as a method of protecting
churches form the state; (2) the Jeffersonian view, which viewed separation as a
method of protecting the state from religion; and (3) the Madisonian view, which
believed that both religion and government would best be served by total freedom of
each from intrusion by the other. See L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-3, at 816. Courts
have defined the establishment clause to mean that "[n]either a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
93. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
94. Id. at 1264-65 (construing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1663 to 1669 (Supp. 1981)).
95. E.g., D. Gish, EVOLUTION The Fossils Say No! (1978) (published by
Creation-Life Publishers); Institute for Creation Research, Scientific Creationism
(H. Morris ed. 1974) (same). Some textbooks have been the focus of several judicial
and administrative inquiries. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255, 1270-72 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (evaluation of creationist texts); Hendren v. Camp-
bell, No. S577-0139, slip op. at 19 (Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977) (found that the
sole purpose of the creationist textbook, J. Moore & H. Slusher, Biology, A Search for
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and published by creationist organizations"" to explain creation-sci-
ence. One such textbook, Scientific Creationism, 97 sets forth the "crea-
tion model," which theorizes that "the universe was simply called into
existence by the omnipotence, in accord with the omniscience of the
Order in Complexity (1974), was the "promotion and inclusion of fundamentalist
Christian doctrine in the public schools," and held that the textbook could not be
constitutionally accepted in the state's public schools); Public Funds for Textbooks
Presenting Evolutionary Theory of Origin Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First
Amendment, 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 262 (Cal. 1975); Balanced Treatment for Scientific
Creationism and Evolution Act, Op. Att'y Gen. (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979). But cf. Public
School Science Instruction, supra note 8, at 559 (evaluation of textbooks concluding
their use is constitutionally acceptable).
96. Among the creationist organizations in existence are the Institute for Crea-
tion Research, the Creation Science Research Center, and the Creation Research
Society, McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark.
1982), the Southern California Branch-Bible Science Association and the Bible Sci-
ence Association. Bates, supra note 7, at 52-63. These organizations have religious
affiliations and viewpoints. To become a member of the Creation Research Society
applicants are required to subscribe to the following statement: "'(1) The Bible is the
written Word of God, and because we believe it to be inspired [throughout], all of its
assertions are historically and scientifically true in all of the original autographs. To
the student of nature, this means that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual
presentation of simple historical truths. (2) All basic types of living things, including
man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in
Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accom-
plished only changes within the original created kinds. (3) The great Flood described
in Genesis, commonly referred to as Noahcian Deluge, was an historical event,
worldwide in its extent and effect. (4) Finally, we are an organization of Christian
men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord and Savior. The account of the
special creation of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and their subsequent
Fall into sin, is the basis for our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind.
Therefore, salvation can come only [through] accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior.' "
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 n.7 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(quoting Creation Research Society membership application). The first "scientific"
fundamentalist organization, the American Scientific Affiliation, also required ad-
herence to a statement of religious faith by its applicants. Bates, supra note 7, at 33-
34. These affiliations and viewpoints have been adjudged to permeate creation-
science so as to make its inclusion in public school curriculum unconstitutional.
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264-65 (E.D. Ark. 1982); see
Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, slip op. at 5-12 (Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14,
1977); Public Funds For Textbooks Presenting Evolutionary Theory of Origin
Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First Amendment, 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 262, 270-
73 (Cal. 1975); Balanced Treatment for Scientific Creationism and Evolution Act,
Op. Att'y Gen. at 11-13 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979).
97. Institute for Creation Research, Scientific Creationism (H. Morris general
ed. 1974). The text is printed in two editions, the public school edition and the
general edition. The latter contains inside the front cover a provision concerning its
use in public schools: ."T HIS BOOK IS NOT DESIGNED OR APPROPRIATE FOR
PUBLIC SCHOOL USE, AND SHOULD NOT BE USED IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
IN ANY WAY. Books for public schools discuss scientific evidence that supports
creation-science or evolution-science. This book instead discusses religious concepts
or materials that support creationist religions or evolutionist religions, and such
religious materials should not be used in public schools." This provision was included
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Creator."98 The text concedes that proof of this part of the theory "is
inaccessible to the scientific method," 99 and suggests that -[t]he Crea-
tor does not create at the whim of a scientist."' 00  Much of the
textbook is devoted to showing the improvidence' 0' and improbabil-
ity 0 2 of the theory of evolution and to proving the likelihood of an
historical worldwide flood. 1
03
The McLean court, however, is not the first court to be confronted
with the task of distinguishing public school presentation of material
that conforms to religious concepts but has secular educational value
from material that results in the establishment of religion. In Wiley v.
Franklin,10 4 a federal district court considered a challenge to programs
providing for Bible study in a city and a county school district in
Tennessee. 05 The objective of the challenged program was to present
because the general edition contains a chapter devoted to the discussion of creation
according to the Bible which is not included in the public school edition. Id. at 203.
This chapter is divided into sections, some of which are entitled Historicity of the
Genesis Record, id., Divisions of Genesis, id. at 204, Summary of the Biblical Model,
id. at 214, and Theistic Evolution. Id. at 215.
98. Institute for Creation Research, Scientific Creationism 17 (H. Morris public
school ed. 1974).
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id.
101. The Creationist authors find it objectionable to teach evolution exclusively
because evolution "tends to remove all moral and ethical restraints from the student
and leads to an animalistic amoralism in practice." Id. at 15. The text further finds
that "[e]volutionary philosophy often leads to a conviction that might makes right,
leading either to anarchism (uncontrolled evolution) or collectivism (controlled evo-
lution)." Id. Conversely, the authors believe that teaching creationism is -reasonable
and salutary" because "[c]reationism is consistent with the innate thoughts and daily
experiences of the child and thus is conducive to his mental health. He knows, as part
of his own experience of reality, that a house implies a builder and a watch a
watchmaker." Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 14-15. See generally D. Gish, supra note 95. Gish's book is self-
described as "one of the most devastating critiques of the evolutionary philosophy one
could find. It... demolishes its central bastion." Id. at 9.
103. Institute for Creation Research, Scientific Creationism 117-20 (H. Morris
public school ed. 1974). The text attempts to illustrate an historic flood by stating
"[v]isualize, then, a great hydraulic cataclysm bursting upon the present world, with
currents of waters pouring perpetually from the skies and erupting continuously from
the earth's crust, all over the world, for weeks on end, until the entire globe was
submerged, . . . sooner or later all land animals would perish .... Human beings
would swim, run, climb, and attempt to escape the floods but, unless a few managed
to ride out the cataclysm in unusually strong watertight sea-going vessels, they would
eventually all drown or otherwise perish." Id. at 117.
104. 468 F. Supp. 133 (proposed teaching of Bible study course in city and county
elementary schools enjoined for violating first amendment), modified, 474 F. Supp.
525 (1979) (modified proposal approved, subject to one-year court supervision),
modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (courses implemented approved for
city schools, enjoined in county schools).
105. Id. at 136. The program at issue was originally organized by a citizens group
that was later formalized into the Public School Bible Study Committee. Id. This
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the Bible for its literary and historic value by allowing the Bible to
"speak for itself,"1 6 thus avoiding interpretation by teachers.
In Malnak v. Yogi,10 7 a New Jersey public school program teaching
Transcendental Meditation, characterized as secular philosophy, was
challenged as government establishment of religion. 0 8 Five local
boards of education provided for an elective course in the Science of
Creative Intelligence/Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM). °0 Tran-
scendental Meditation is a technique whereby the meditator contem-
plates a meaningless sound. 10 The Science of Creative Intelligence is
a theory that seeks to describe and explain what occurs within the
meditator's mind during meditation"' through the concept of "crea-
tive intelligence," considered by its proponents to be the source of all
thought. 112
committee raised funds for teachers' salaries, played an active role in teacher selec-
tion, trained teachers and prepared the curricula for the courses. Id. Participation in
the Bible study courses was on an elective basis. Id. at 137. The committee also
prepared a curriculum guide that listed basic course objectives for the program:
exposure to literature, music and art based on or alluded to in the Bible, learning
about cultural values originated in the Bible and the gaining of an understanding of
important contemporary events. Id. at 140. The guide also included sixteen lesson
plans for each grade. Id. Contained within these plans were objectives, methods,
lesson titles, Biblical references and lesson emphasis. Id. The program for each grade
included an introduction to the Bible, the chronological presentation of Biblical
characters and events from the Old Testament and a final miscellaneous lesson based
upon a Biblical theme. Id. at 140-41 n.3.
106. Id. at 141.
107. 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979).
108. Id. at 1287.
109. Id. at 1288.
110. Id. at 1288-89. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi introduced Transcendental Medita-
tion to the United States in 1959. D. Denniston & P. McWilliams, The TM Book 11
(1975). TM practitioners believe that the practice of Transcendental Meditation
results in a state of restful alertness which is superior to relaxation and sleep. Id. at
57. Some of the mental benefits of the program are alleged to include: increased
intelligence growth rate, id. at 61, increased learning ability, id. at 63, increased
speed in accurately solving problems, id. at 65, improved academic performance, id.
at 67, increased productivity, id. at 71, 73, improved job performance, id. at 75,
increased job satisfaction, id. at 79, improved relations with supervisors, id. at 81,
and improved relations with co-workers. Id. at 83. Physical benefits of the program
are alleged to include: increased adaptability, id. at 90-93, increased stability, id. at
96-99, faster reaction time, id. at 107, and superior perceptual-motor performance.
Id. at 109. The program, in addition, has been correlated to rehabilitation of
prisoners, id. at 197, 199, and reduction in drug abuse. Id. at 203.
111. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam.
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 1288-89. Creative intelligence purportedly injects creativity into the
meditator's mind, strengthens and clarifies his or her thoughts, expands his or her
perceptions and refines the nervous system. Id. at 1289. It possesses at least fifty
qualities, including purposefulness, beauty, truth, efficiency, sweetness, universality,
joy, insight, courage and eternity. Id. at 1290, 1293-95. It is asserted that these
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In McLean, Wiley and Malnak, the courts found the proposed or
implemented additions to public school curriculum to be religious
lessons in violation of the establishment clause." 3
A. Determining Whether Public School
Curriculum is Impermissibly Religious
The establishment clause dictates that courts, when investigating
school curriculum, ensure that the state is not using its tax-established
and supported education system to assist programs of religious instruc-
tion" 4 or to provide sectarian groups with pupils for their religious
teachings." 5 Religious instruction in the public school classroom has
been found by the Supreme Court to promote a union of church and
state that "tends to destroy government and to degrade religion."16
Attempts to assimilate religious doctrine into public schools by
characterizing it as secular academics requires a new.' judicial perspec-
tive on traditional establishment clause inquiry. The courts' opinions
in McLean, Wiley and Malnak together provide a standard to deter-
qualities may only be attained by practicing TM, id. at 1291, which is "perpetually
active in all aspects of the universe." Id. at 1292.
113. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 151, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525 (1979),
modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F .Supp. 1284,
1323-24 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
114. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948);
see, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (prayers and Bible
reading in tax-supported public schools result in citizens being forced to support a
religious exercise they may not want); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 316, 318
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (allowing children to leave public schools for religious
instruction enables religious groups to get participants for their programs).
115. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); accord
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) ("manipulat-
ing ... compulsory education lavs to help religious sects get pupils... [i]s not
separation but combination of Church and State").
116. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); accord School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963). A similar result might be evidenced by the provision of aid
to sectarian institutions. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 659-61 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-54
(1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66 (1976); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23
(1971). A divisive influence is evidenced by an abundance of legal actions. See, e.g.,
Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 927, 932 (1980) (City of Philadelphia
expended over $200,000 to construct a special platform and to provide other types of
assistance for the visit of Pope John Paul II in the fall of 1979; at least three separate
groups brought suit to enjoin these expenditures), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
A large number of parties to a suit might also indicate that the issues involved are
extremely important to disparate groups. See generally Complaint, McLean v.
Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (complaint lists 22
plaintiffs, 15 of whom are affiliated with or represent religious interests).
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mine whether material interposed into public schools constitutes es-
tablishment of religion.
1. Defining and Finding Religion
A court's threshold inquiry in this determination is whether the
challenged curriculum contains religious concepts. Although courts
have avoided an inflexible definition of religion," 7 an examination of
activities and ideas that have been held religious serves as a guide."t 8
Public school curriculum has been found to be religious when it
contains concepts associated with traditional religions. For example,
courts have held that the concept of a supreme being is inherently
religious" 9 and, therefore, a curriculum that includes the concept of a
deity will be considered religious. 120  Creation-science presupposes
the existence of a creator,12 1 and the SCI concept of a "field of creative
intelligence" has the attributes of a supreme being; 122 both were found
to be religious.' 2 3  Therefore, concepts that have "reference to one's
view of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose
of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will"
are religious.12 4
117. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1312 (D.N.J. 1977), aJJ'd per curiang,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. Id.
119. McLean v. Board of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (E.D. Ark. 1982):
Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), afJ'd per curiarn, 592 F.2d
197 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (nonsectarian prayer
found to be religious because it invoked God's blessing); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d
485, 489 (6th Cir. 1975) (Biblical creationism found to be religious because it in-
cludes the concept of a creator); DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School
Dist., 384 F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1967) (recital by a kindergarten class of a simple
poem beginning "We thank you" found to be religious because the "you" referred to a
deity), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (creation-science found to be religious because a
creator is a supreme being); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1323-24 (D.N.J.
1977) (instruction about a "field of creative intelligence" found to be religious), aJJ'd
per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390, 395-
96 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (instruction about a supreme being that performed miraculous
acts found to be religious); Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, slip op. at 19-20
(Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977) (Biblical creationism found to be religious because it
includes the concept of a creator).
121. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264-66 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
122. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aJf'd per curial,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
123. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264-66 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiarn, 592
F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); see Public Funds for Textbooks Presenting Evolutionary
Theory of Origin Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First Amendment, 58 Op.
Att'y Gen. 262, 272-73 (Cal. 1975); Balanced Treatment for Scientific Creationism
and Evolution Act, Op. Att'y Gen. at 11-14 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979).
124. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
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Similarly, concepts derived from traditional scripture are reli-
gious. 1 -5 The Wiley court found the material sought to be interposed
into the public schools to be religious because "the Bible is a religious
book, or, more accurately stated, a collection of religious books and
writings which have been selected and assembled for the religious
teachings and messages therein conveyed." 2 6 In McLean, the court
found that creation-science "has as its unmentioned reference the first
chapters of the Book of Genesis" and therefore is religious.'-'
A system of beliefs need not, however, be part of a traditional
religion or analogous to more established religions to be found reli-
gious under the first amendment. 28 A belief or concept not derived
from a particular religious sect may be religious. 29  A functional
standard for determining if an idea is religious poses the question
"whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God." 130
A concept serves the function of a religious belief if it addresses the
fundamental questions of the "'theories of man's nature or his place in
the Universe.'' a3 Many disciplines, such as science, philosophy or
history, attempt to answer important and even fundamental ques-
125. See. e.g.. School Dist. v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (Bible reading
found to be religious because "'the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
cannot be gainsaid"): McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266
(E.D. Ark. 1982) (creation-science found to be religious because it "'is inspired by the
Book of Genesis").
126. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133. 149, modified. 474 F. Supp. 525
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
127. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (E.D. Ark.
1982); see Genesis 1:1-31 (Revised Standard Version) ("And God saw everything that
he had made, and behold, it was very good. And there was evening and there was
morning, a sixth day."); id. 2:7 ("Then the Lord God formed man of dust from the
ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: and man became a living
being."); id. 5:1 (When God created man, he made him in the likeness of God.).
128. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1313 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979): see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-407
(1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163. 179-84 (1965): Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961); Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States. 409 F.2d 1146, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969): DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist.,
384 F.2d 836, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied. 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
129. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1313 (D.N.J. 1977), off'd per curiam,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979): see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (nonde-
nominational prayer found to be religious): Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-
90 (1961) (affirmation of a belief in God found to be religious).
130. United States v. Seeger. 380 U.S. 163. 166 (1965) (defendant expressed
skepticism in the existence of God but held a religious faith in an ethical creed).
Although Seeger and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), involved statutory
interpretation rather than a constitutional question, their definitional analyses of the
term religion have significance for first amendment cases as well. See Malnak v.
Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
131. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
141
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tions. 132 An idea will have a religious nature, however, if it offers a
comprehensive "truth" in response to ultimate issues. 133  A Third
Circuit Judge, concurring in Malnak, found that curriculum takes on
attributes of religion when it provides "a systematic series of answers"
to fundamental questions that "overflows into other academic disci-
plines as the guiding idea of a student's pursuits." 134
Government sponsored activities that encompass traditional reli-
gious conduct or ceremony have been found to be religious.135  Non-
denominational prayer and Bible readings conducted in public schools
as a routine part of the school day136 or as voluntary extracurricular
student activity 137 have been held to be religious activities. Further-
more, public school curriculum that is analogous to traditional reli-
gious ceremony has also been found religious. 138  In Malnak, for
example, students were required to attend a "puja" ceremony, con-
ducted on Sunday off school premises, as the culmination of the SCI/
TM course.139 The students brought a handkerchief, several pieces of
fruit and some flowers, and a teacher recited a Sanskrit chant, en-
gaged in certain gestures and gave each student a mantra.140  Al-
though both students and teachers disclaimed the religious nature of
the ceremony,' 14 the court found the activity to include offerings and
prayer, which it held were clearly religious conduct.142
132. Id. at 208-09.
133. Id. at 209.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (same); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924
(3d Cir. 1980) (city funding of Roman Catholic Mass performed by the Pope), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977)
(prayer and ceremonial offerings), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
136. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962).
137. E.g., Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 761-62 (9th
Cir. 1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981); Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 394 F. Supp.
417, 423 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
138. E.g., Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 911 (D.S.D. 1979)
(Christmas assemblies), aff'd, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987
(1980), Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977) (transcendental medita-
Iiwi) af'd per curiarn, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
13!). Malnak,.. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1305 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
140. Id.
141. Id. The court cautioned of "[t]he inappropriateness of a standard which
places ... importance on the proponents' characterization of their beliefs and ac-
tivities ... in the context of an establishment clause case in which the proponents
have enlisted the aid of governmental entities in the propagation of their beliefs." Id.
at 1319-20.
142. Id. at 1323.
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2. Applying the Establishment Clause
Test to Public School Curriculum
A court's inquiry into whether public school curriculum constitutes
establishment of religion is not complete upon its finding that the
material contains religious concepts. Material may conform to reli-
gious concepts or be derived from a religious source and still be
presented in public schools without violating the establishment
clause. 143 For an alteration of public school curriculum to comport
with the establishment clause, it "[f]irst . .. must have a secular
... purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally [it] must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' "144 To pass this
test, a challenged addition to public school curriculum must satisfy all
three prongs. 145
a. Purpose and Effect
The issues of whether the government has a secular purpose for
including material in public school curriculum and whether classroom
presentation of the material advances religion are closely related. For
a governmental act to have a secular purpose, and therefore satisfy the
first prong of the establishment clause test, it must be justified in
secular terms, 146 such as the provision of benefits to the general pub-
143. Bible study courses may be offered in public schools without violating the
constitution if they are "so planned and so taught as to constitute a secular and
objective study of the Bible for its historic and literary worth." Wiley v. Franklin,
468 F. Supp. 133, 146, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525 (1979), modified 497 F. Supp.
390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); accord Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968)
("study... of the Bible.. . [need not] collide with the First Amendment's prohibi-
tion"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963) ("study of the Bible . .
may ... be effected consistently with the First Amendment").
144. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The test is based upon cumulative criteria
developed and refined in numerous cases. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-
36 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 74445 (1976); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975): Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479 (1973);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667-68, 674 (1970); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (196S): School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. .121. 436
(1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961): Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947).
145. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
772-74 (1973).
146. L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 14-8, at 833. This prong of the establishment
clause test can be considered an aid in determining the effects of the challenged
enactment, as required by the second prong of the test. See Note, Legislative Purpose
and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1887, 1898-99 (1970).
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lie. 147 To satisfy the second prong of the establishment clause test a
governmental act must possess a "principal or primary effect ... that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."1 48  A statute will be consid-
ered to have a primary effect of advancing religion "[filf the primary
end achieved by [it] is the affirmation or promotion of religious doc-
trine-primary, in the sense that all secular ends which it purportedly
The secular legislative purpose test was the first standard to be applied by the Courts.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968). Since that time it has been an
accepted standard for purposes of review for alleged violations of the establishment
clause. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653
(1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736. 754 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479 n.7
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). If both a secular and nonsecular purpose are found, a
program will succeed in satisfying this test if the nonsecular purpose is deemed
incidental and ancillary to the primary secular purpose. For example, although the
purpose of Sunday closing laws was initially religious, the Court indicated its willing-
ness to evaluate current community standards and customs to find that a legislative
purpose could change to fit the requirements of the establishment clause. Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 624-26 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 602-05 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-35 (1961). To determine the legislative
purpose of a statute, courts will (a) look to the face of the statute, see Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1980); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 351-52, 363, 367-68 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828-30
(1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 678-79 (1971), (b) its legislative history, see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 363, 367-68 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1973); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73
(1970); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68-72 (2d Cir. 1977); Gartner v.
Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968), and
(c) the circumstances which preceded the statute and culminated in its enactment.
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968); United States v. Zachs, 375
U.S. 59, 62 (1963); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 598 (1961); McGo-
wan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-50 (1961); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ.,
529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-64 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
147. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968) (lending of textbooks to
parochial and public school students); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18
(1947) (transportation reimbursements to parents of parochial school students).
148. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citation omitted); accord
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
678 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Bible reading and prayer recitation have been
found violative of this requirement. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962); DeSpain v. DeKalb County
Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
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serves are derivative from, not wholly independent of, the advance-
ment of religion."'149  Even if a government act has a substantial
secular effect it may still be found to be an unconstitutional advance-
ment of religion if its "direct and immediate effect" is to advance
religion.' 50
Although the judiciary has exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the
hidden motives of legislatures,' 5' it will probe beyond stated purpose
906 (1968). Voluntary student-run prayer programs have also been held unconstitu-
tional. E.g., Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir.)
("the primary effect of [voluntary] prayer appears to advance religion"), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 322 (1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir.
1980) ("prayer meetings would create an improper appearance of official support,
and the prohibition against impermissibly advancing religion would be violated"),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981); Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 394 F.
Supp. 417, 425 (E.D. Ark. 1973) ("the arrangement presents substantial elements of
inherent pressure by the school system in the interest of religion").
149. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); accord Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1960). This requirement of non-advancement has been satisfied by the provision of
textbooks to parochial school students, see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
243-44 (1968), the granting of transportation reimbursements for parents of paro-
chial school students, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947), and
the provision of real property tax exemptions to religious organizations. See Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
150. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 784
n.39 (1973); Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, No. 80-1653, slip op. at 14 (1st Cir.
1981); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 6S0-81 (1971).
151. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) ("There is no reason to
believe the legislatures meant anything else."). The Court since 1971 has consistently
based its finding of a constitutionally acceptable secular purpose on the stated
purposes of the statute itself. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 351-52, 363, 367-68 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 8-5,
829-30 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 763-65, 773 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1973); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Edue. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1973); Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1971). Since the expression in Lemon of
reluctance to go beyond the stated purposes of the statute itself, only one case has
been found to have infringed the first prong of the establishment clause test by the
Supreme Court. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). Lower courts,
however, have invalidated statutes and governmental mandates based upon a lack of
secular purpose. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 480 F. Supp. 1161, 1166-
67 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1323-24 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979). Courts have been reluctant to look beyond the stated
purpose of legislative acts concerning the allocation of public resources. See, e.g.,
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 679-80 (1970) (tax exemptions for religious
organizations); Board of Edue. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1968) (provision of
textbooks to parochial school students).
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when the issue concerns alleged intrusion of sectarian forces into
public schools.' 5 2  This close judicial scrutiny conforms to the policy
that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools." 1 53
The only secular purpose a state may have for including material in
public school curriculum is the advancement of secular educational
interests. 5 4 Therefore, after finding the material to contain religious
concepts, the first step in secular-purpose analysis of additions to
public school curriculum is to determine whether the material could
advance any secular educational interest. A court may, for example,
elicit the opinions of professional educators and academicians as to the
material's educational value.' 55 When inclusion of religious material
is not endorsed by professional educators but rather is the result of
concerted activity by religious groups, it will not only fail the secular-
purpose prong of the establishment clause test'- 6 but when presented
in the classroom will have an effect that advances religion.' 5 7 Teach-
ing material of a decidedly religious nature, devoid of secular educa-
tional value, in public schools places "the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government . . . behind a particular religious"
doctrine, and therefore, impermissibly advances religion.' 8
In McLean, the state asserted that creation-science is scientifically
supportable and, therefore, suitable for inclusion into public school
curriculum.' 59 Although the statute constituted an unprecedented
152. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (the Court
considered purpose of anti-evolution statute); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223-24 (1963) (the Court considered the purpose of Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (the Court considered purpose of prayer recitation); Two
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592, 598 (1961) (the Court considered purpose of
Sunday closing laws); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-45, 451 (1961)
(same); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1952) (the Court considered
purpose of "released time" programs); see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 207-10 (1948) (same).
153. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
154. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
155. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1270-72 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 141-42, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
156. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1263-64 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 150-51, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
157. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 151, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525 (1979),
modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
158. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); accord School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 221, 223 (1963).
159. See sources cited supra note 10.
1146 [Vol. 50
1982] PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM & RELIGION
intrusion into curriculum, the state had engaged in no legislative fact-
finding as to the materials' educational value. ,60 The McLean court
therefore refused to defer to the legislature's stated purpose"'1 and
undertook its own investigation of whether teaching creation-science
would advance secular educational interests. Guided by the testimony
of the academic and scientific expert witnesses and a review of rele-
160. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
161. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(construing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1667 (Supp. 1981)). The legislative purpose of the
statute included "protecting academic freedom for students* differing values and
beliefs; ensuring neutrality toward students' diverse religious convictions; ensuring
freedom of religious exercise for students and their parents; guaranteeing freedom of
belief and speech for students: preventing establishment of Theologically Liberal,
Humanist, Nontheist [Nonatheist], or Atheist religions, preventing discrimination
against students on the basis of their personal beliefs concerning creation and evolu-
tion; and assisting students in their search for the truth." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1668
(Supp. 1981). An avowed secular purpose, however, is not sufficient to avoid conflict
with the establishment clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980); see Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223-25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423, 425 (1962). The purposes of
protecting academic freedom and assisting students in their search for the truth
expressly stated in the statute challenged in McLean would appear to satisfy this
requirement. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1668 (Supp. 1981). However, since it wa
shown that the legislature's stated purpose in enacting the statute was not its actual
purpose and that its sole intent was to benefit religion, it failed the secular legislative
purpose test. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D. Ark.
1982). Evaluation of the purpose of preventing establishment of theologically liberal,
humanist, nontheist, or atheist religions implies that the teaching of evolution,
without equal time given to creation-science, amounts to an establishment of religion
and is constitutionally impermissible. It has been consistently found, however, that
the teaching and presentation of evolution does not constitute an establishment of
religion. Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 462 F. Supp. 725, 727 (D.D.C. 1978), afJJd.
636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 15574-75, slip op. at 4-5
(D.D.C. May 25, 1972), affid mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208.
1210 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afj'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974). The legislative purpose of ensuring neutrality regarding diserse
religious convictions of students by presentation of creation-science would also fail
the secular legislative purpose test. The notion that teaching creation-science in the
public schools would serve to neutralize the exclusive presentation of evolution does
not meet the criteria of neutrality required by the first amendment. See Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1976); Gilette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 448-54 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-07
(1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-24 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). Such a constitutionally neutral statute would require that
all theories of creation be given equal or balanced treatment in the public schools.
Daniel v. Waters, 399 F. Supp. 510, 511-12 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). By requiring
instruction solely in creation-science such statutes are attempting to tailor instruction
to reflect the principles of a particular sect. This is clearly in violation of the
establishment clause. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
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vant scientific and educational materials, the court concluded that
creation-science is "fallacious pedagogy"16 2 with no secular purpose.
162. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267, 1267-72 (E.D.
Ark. 1982). Many members of the academic community do not accept creation-
science as scientific theory. See Eldredge, Creationism Isn't Science, New Republic,
Apr. 14, 1981, at 15-16 ("No form of creationism even remotely qualifies for inclu-
sion in a science curriculum."); Gould, Evolution as Fact and Theory, Discover, May
1981, at 35 ("The entire creationist argument involves little more than a rhetorical
attempt to falsify evolution ...."); Kyle, Should "Scientific" Creation and the
Science of Evolution be Taught with Equal Emphasis?, 17 J. Research Science Tehg.
519, 525 (1980) ("There is no justifiable scientific basis for the inclusion of the special
creation doctrine in science classrooms."); see also Alexander, Evolution, Creation.
and Biology Teaching, Am. Biology Tchr., Feb. 1978, at 91, 91-92; Cloud, Evolu-
tion Theory and Creation Mythology, Humanist, Nov./Dec. 1977, at 53, 53:
Dobzhansky, Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution, Am.
Biology Tchr., Mar. 1973, at 125, 125; Godfrey, The Flood of Antievolutionisn,
Nat. Hist., June 1981, at 4, 4; Mayr, Evolution vs. Special Creation, Am. Biology
Tchr., Jan. 1971, at 49, 49: Rosenfeld, Antievolutionary Misconceptions, Am. Biol-
ogy Tchr., Dec. 1977, at 547, 547. Scientific organizations have officially opposed
the introduction of creation-science into the public schools. See Physics Today, Feb.
1982, at 53 (groups opposed to teaching creation-science in the public schools in-
clude: the Council of the American Physical Society, the American Geological Insti-
tute, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Association of Biology
Teachers). One reason for this opposition is that creation-science does not possess the
essential characteristics of science. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Proponents of the inclusion of creation-science
often disagree as to whether it is indeed a science; they often equate both creation-
science and evolution with religion. See Pre-Trial Brief for Plaintiffs at 24-26,
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Gish, The
Scopes Trial in Reverse, Humanist, Nov./Dec. 1977, at 1, 1. Creationists have by
devising and promoting the scientific creation model attempted to secularize their
beliefs:
SCIENTIFIC CREATION MODEL:
I. Special creation of the universe
and earth (by a Creator), on the
basis of scientific evidence.
II. Application of the entropy law to
produce deterioration in the
earth and life, on the basis of
scientific evidence.
III. Special creation of life (by a
Creator), on the basis of
scientific evidence.
IV. Fixity of original plant and
animal kinds, on the basis
of scientific evidence.
V. Distinct ancestry of man and
apes, on the basis of scientific
evidence.
BIBLICAL CREATION MODEL:
I. Divine creation of the heaven, stars,
and earth by God, on the basis of
Genesis.
II. Application of the curse, pronounced
by God after Adam's fall, to produce
deterioration in the earth and life,
on the basis of Genesis.
III. Divine creation of plant and animal
life, Adam the first man, and Eve
from Adam's side by God, on the basis
of Genesis.
IV. Fixity of original plant and animal
kinds, determined by God, on the
basis of Genesis.
V. Distinct ancestry of Adam and apes,
on the basis of Genesis.
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The publicly announced motives of the statute's sponsor, 63 historical
efforts of the state to ban the teaching of evolution,' 64 and the motives
of residents of Arkansas who supported enactment of the statute were
considered in reaching the conclusion'6 5 that proponents of public
school creation-science instruction in Arkansas adhered to and advo-
cated the teaching of Biblical creation.' 66 The creationist movement,
the court found, had made repeated unsuccessful attempts to remove
evolution from public schools, 167 to mandate instruction in Genesis,
and finally to promote the idea that the Genesis account can be
supported by scientific data. 68  Because creation-science was found
VI. Explanation of much of the earth's VI. Explanation of the earth's geology
geology by a worldwide deluge, by a world-wide flood in which only
on the basis of scientific Noah, his family, and animal pairs
evidence, were preserved in an ark, on the
basis of Genesis.
VII. Relatively recent origin of VII. Approximately six thousand year
the earth and living kinds time span since creation of the earth,
(in comparison with several life, and Adam, on the basis of Genesis.
billion years), on the basis
of scientific evidence.
Bird, The Two Creation Models, Acts & Facts, Dec. 1978, at 12, 12-13.
163. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1262-63, 1263-64
(E.D. Ark. 1982). The statute was drafted by a respiratory therapist with training in
neither law nor science, id. at 1261, and the act was introduced into the legislature
with the aid of two ministers. Id. at 1262.
164. Id. at 1263.
165. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1263-64 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
166. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
167. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264 (E.D. Ark.
1982); see supra note 3 and accompanying text; cf. Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485,
489-91 (6th Cir. 1975) (invalidating Tennessee statute requiring science textbooks to
characterize evolution as theory, not fact, and mandating equal time be given to
other theories of the origin of man, including the Genesis account); Steele v. Waters,
527 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Tenn. 1975) (same). The first fundamentalist organization
formed with a definite plan to combat evolution was the World's Christian Funda-
mentals Association in 1919. Bates, supra note 7, at 20. During the 1920"s more than
four organizations were formed with the sole goal of opposing evolutionary concepts
being taught in public schools. Id. at 20-21. These organizations attempted to use
legislative influence to pass anti-evolution statutes. Id. at 23-24. The Southern Cali-
fornia Branch-Bible Science Association was formed in 1963 to mandate that evolu-
tion be qualified as a "theory" in the public schools of the state. Id. at 56-61.
168. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259-60 (E.D. Ark.
1982). Scientific legitimation began with the publication of the New Geology in 1923
by George McCready Price. Bates, supra note 7, at 22. The Research Science Bureau
was formed in 1921 to promote scientific legitimation. Id. The American Scientific
Affiliation was formed in 1941 as a vehicle for representation of these interests
including the publication of a college student handbook. Id. at 33-35. The Creation
Research Society was formed on the basis that there is scientific evidence for the
origins of man and of the universe as held by fundamentalists. Id. at 79-82. The
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to be religious in character, devoid of secular educational value, and
its inclusion into public school curriculum the result of concerted
activity by organized religion,6 9 the Arkansas statute failed the first
prong of the establishment clause test. The court found an interrela-
tionship between the purpose and effects prongs, holding that "[s]ince
creation-science is not science, the conclusion is inescapable that the
only real effect of [the] Act . . . is the advancement of religion." 170
In Wiley, although the school districts' stated purpose for their
Bible education plan was the teaching of Biblical material for its
historic and literary value,17 1 the court found the plan to be devoid of
a secular purpose. 72 The court examined the motives behind spon-
sorship of the program. It found that the course was designed, funded
and to be taught by a "Bible Study Committee," comprised of Funda-
mentalist Christians who were independent of the control of profes-
sional educators.1 7:3 It was clear from the facts that the sole motiva-
tion of the Bible Study Committee for advocating and developing the
present tactics employed for scientific legitimation include legal and legislative
action, publicity, propaganda, local pressure and the presentation of scientifically
credible individuals to lend prestige to the cause. Id. at 108-23.
169. See Bates, supra note 7, at 44-45, 80. At the end of 1981, creation-science
legislation had been enacted in two states and as many as eighteen other states were
considering similar proposals. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255, 1260 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Newsweek, January 13, 1982, at 75. The attorney
generals in California and South Carolina have both been confronted with questions
concerning the inclusion of creation-science in the public school classrooms of their
states. See Public Funds for Textbooks Presenting Evolutionary Theory of Origin
Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First Amendment, 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 262 (Cal.
1975); Balanced Treatment for Scientific Creationism and Evolution Act, Op. Att'y
Gen. (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979). In California, the issue involved was the duty of the State
Board of Education to include creation-science in textbooks that contained the theory
of evolution. Public Funds for Textbooks Presenting Evolutionary Theory of Origin
Only-"Neutrality Requirements" In First Amendment, 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 262, 263,
270 (Cal. 1975). The Attorney General concluded that no court would hold that such
a duty existed on the part of a Board of Education because of creation-science's
"status as religious belief." Id. at 272-73. In South Carolina, the Attorney General
was presented with a proposed bill requiring balanced treatment for evolution and
creation-science in the public schools. Balanced Treatment for Scientific Creationism
and Evolution Act, Op. Att'y Gen. at 1 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1979). It was concluded that
creation-science was "most probably a religious doctrine," id. at 11, and that it
would therefore "most probably . . . violate the First Amendment." Id. at 22.
170. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(emphasis in original).
171. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 137, 142, 149, modified, 474 F. Supp.
525 (1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); see supra note 143.
172. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 151, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
173. Id. at 150-51. The Bible Study Committee's membership was made up almost
entirely of people who identify themselves with Protestant or other Christian faiths.
Id. at 136-37, 150. The Committee had the responsibility of management and
supervision of the program. Id. at 136, 150.
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program was religious. 174 In Wiley, as in McLean, because the prof-
fered material was religious in nature, its purpose exclusive of secular
educational interests and its use religiously motivated, the program
was found to have no secular purpose and if taught in public schools
would advance religion. 175
b. Effects and Entanglement
If material that contains religious concepts is found to have the
potential to advance secular educational interests, a court's analysis
must shift to how the material is being presented and wvhether presen-
tation impermissibly advances religion. 76 Evaluating classroom pre-
sentation of material is crucial to the effects test because
[o]ur nation's elementary and secondary schools play a unique role
in transmitting basic and fundamental values to our youth. To an
impressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular in-
volvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has
placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This symbolic
inference is too dangerous to permit. 7
The program in Wiley was modified by the parties and subse-
quently reviewed by the court.17  The revised program sought to
implement a lesson plan that included solely secular educational
themes and provided for direct supervision by the school boards and
instruction by school personnel "without participation by any non-
school person or organization." '79 Given the alterations in the pro-
grams, the court found that secular educational interests could be
174. Id. at 150. The court did acknowledge, however, that the Bible Study
Committee had attempted to tailor their program to satisfy first amendment require-
ments but was unable to do so partly because of "'the depth of religious commitment
on the part of its membership and leadership." Id. at 150.
175. Id. at 151.
176. Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390, 393-96 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), Malnak v.
Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1323-24 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam. 592 F.2d 197 (3d
Cir. 1979).
177. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
178. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525 (1979),
modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). These changes included (1) the
establishment of religiously neutral employment standards for teachers, id. at 152-
previously, the selection committee inquired into the prospective teachers' belief and
love of God, id. at 138, in addition these teachers vere all members of Protestant
churches, id.-(2) elimination of prejudiced teachers, see id. at 152, (3) establish-
ment of a teacher-hiring and supervision system under the control of the schools, id.
at 152-previously the Committee had this responsibility, id. -and (4) revision of
the curriculum to reflect secular purposes. Id. at 152.
179. Wiley v. Franklin, 474 F. Supp. 525, 528 (1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. Tenn. 1980).
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served 180 because, -although the Bible is a religious document,' 8 ' it also
is
replete with writings relevant to such secular subjects and interests
as history ... literature, poetry, music, art ... [and] a broad
range of subjects, values, interests, and activities encompassed
within the generalized phrase "Western civilization." To ignore the
role of the Bible in [this] vast area of secular subjects ...is to
ignore a keystone in the building of an arch, at least insofar as
Western history, values and culture are concerned. 2
Because the court found analysis of written descriptions of the pro-
grams insufficient to determine the effect of classroom presentation of
the material, tape recordings of actual lessons were reviewed. 183 The
city's program was found to have a permissible effect because it
constituted "non-devotional instruction in biblical history [and] litera-
ture." 18 4 The lesson consisted of Biblical stories told without Biblical
readings, in a narrative fashion, placed in an historical time frame,
designed to teach a history lesson and to illustrate the meaning of
parables.8 5 The county's program, however, was found to convey
religious lessons that had an impermissible effect of advancing reli-
gion.18 6 The evaluated lessons contained frequent references to God
or a supreme being who performed noble and often miraculous
feats.' 8 7  No literary or historical themes or information could be
discerned and, therefore, the county's program was enjoined. 88
180. Id. at 531.
181. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 149, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); accord School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
182. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 149-50, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
183. Wiley v. Franklin, 474 F. Supp. 525, 531 (1979) ("It is that which is
taught . . .that renders a course so founded constitutionally permissible or .. .im-
permissible."), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
184. Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390, 395 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). A non-devo-
tional program of instruction in the Bible is one which involves a study of the
advancement of civilization through a study of comparative religion or the history of
religion. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). It has been recog-
nized that Bible study courses fit the strictures of the establishment clause if "pre-
sented objectively as part of a secular program of education." Id. at 225.
185. Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390, 394-95 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). The specific
parable used as a vehicle for discussion in the scrutinized lesson was the parable of
talents. Id. at 394. A parable was compared with Aesop's fables and the class
participated in acting out during class the lesson learned that " 'practice makes
perfect.' " Id. at 394-95.
186. Id. at 396.
187. Id. at 395-96. God was described as controlling all kingdoms, determining
life and death issues, warning people about future events and turning people into
pillars of salt. Id.
188. Id. at 396.
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The district court's analysis in MaInak was similar to that employed
by the court considering the revised plan in Wiley. After deciding that
SCI/TM had indicia of religion, 189 it found that the program had the
potential to advance secular educational interests. The court observed
that practice of TM "is alleged by its proponents to reduce stress in
individuals [that] would result in an increase in educability and socia-
bility among the students taking the course" and concluded that
"[t]his purpose appears to be secular."' 90 The court then shifted its
analysis to the actual classroom presentation of the course and found it
to advance religion impermissibly. '9 Seventy percent of the class
time was spent teaching the theory of SCI,1192 with emphasis on the
religious concept of "a field of creative intelligence."'9 3 The Court
held:
[T]he SCI/TM course teaches that the meaningless sound is merely
a vehicle used by the meditator to contact directly the "'perfection
of existence," a level of life or being beyond and unmanifest to the
mundane universe .... Owing to the religious nature of the con-
cept of the field of pure creative intelligence and creative intelli-
gence, it is apparent that the governmental agencies have sought to
effect a secular goal by the propagation of a religious concept ....
These means of effecting ostensibly secular ends are prohibited by
the establishment clause.' 94
When the effect of classroom presentation of material that contains
religious concepts depends on subtle distinctions to be made by in-
structors regarding the meaning and value of the material, the entan-
glements prong of the establishment clause is implicated.' 95 To sat-
isfy this prong, a governmental act must not result in excessive
189. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1289, 1322-24 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per
curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 1323.
191. Id. at 1323-24.
192. Id. at 1323.
193. Id. at 1323-24.
194. Id. at 1324. The court added that "students wishing to learn the technique of
Transcendental Meditation are compelled to attend a religious ceremony, the puja."
Id.
195. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1-55,
1272 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 151, modified, 474 F.
Supp. 525 (1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Malnak v. Yogi,
440 F. Supp. 1284, 1324 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979). The risk of excessive entanglement of state with religion arises most frequently
when the state grants financial assistance to church institutions for ostensibly secular
purposes. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v.
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entanglement of government with religion.9 8 Administrative entan-
glement arises when a statutory program requires continued surveil-
lance or monitoring by the state. 97  Prohibition of administrative
entanglement prevents intrusion, by either a state or a religious insti-
tution, into the precincts of the other. 98 Concepts that are closely
related to religious doctrine will require the state to monitor classroom
materials'99 and discussions constantly.20 0  If state efforts to assure
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). If state funding requires continuing state surveillance to assure that the
moneys are not used to further religious activities, excessive administrative entangle-
ment results. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762-63 (1976); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-20
(1971); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
660-61 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41, 244, 248, 254 (1977);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971).
196. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Although the entanglements
prong was not formalized as a part of the standard of review for alleged violations of
the establishment clause until 1970, the Supreme Court had previously recognized
that there was no place in society for entanglement between religion and the public
schools and its inevitable divisive influences. See Illinois ex rel, McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Political entangle-
ment arises when communities confronted by political issues become divided along
religious lines, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); Hall v. Bradshaw, 630
F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981), and the electorate
aligns its votes with its faith. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971). The first amendment prohibition of
establishment of religion was implicitly intended to avoid political divisiveness inher-
ent in church-state relations. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971)
("Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are
normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but
political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect."). Political debate will inevitably result
from attempts to include material of a religious character in public school curricula.
As the Supreme Court noted, "[p]robably no deeper division of our people could
proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine
and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in
embracing." Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
197. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (challenged program
would involve continuous surveillance of classroom activity and discussion); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75, 691-92 (1970) (the taxation of religious organiza-
tions and the granting of tax exemptions to such groups would result in governmental
involvement with religion; however, elimination of tax exemption status would
promote numerous entanglement ramifications).
198. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
199. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark.
1982); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
200. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark.
1982); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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that a state-sponsored program remains free from religious influence
"involves state scrutiny of religious activities, a task necessarily requir-
ing oversight of 'core matters of belief and ritual,' ,'01 the prohibition
against entanglements is violated. 20 2
The involvement of a religious group in curriculum development
also presents entanglement problems. Proposed curriculum that is
consistent with religious beliefs is often the product of religious organi-
zations, and textbooks and teaching materials are frequently available
only from those groups. 20 3 In Wiley, for example, the court held:
"[W]ith the Bible Study, Committee not only funding the Bible study
courses but also establishing the curriculum and selecting, training
and supervising the teachers, the public school Bible study program
constitutes as excessive entanglement between government and reli-
gion." 2 0 4
When religious material included in public school curriculum has a
secular purpose, the effect of a proposed change in curriculum must
be carefully evaluated. This inquiry is not only whether material can
be presented as secular instruction, but, if so, whether it lends itself to
improper presentation for the advancement of religion. If, to ensure
proper presentation, the state must constantly monitor public school
instruction, the inclusion of the materials in the curriculum will be an
establishment of religion.
CONCLUSION
Creationists' legal arguments distort settled interpretation of the
first amendment religion clauses. Clearly, conflicts between religious
belief and the content of educational material will not override the
state's interest in education and give rise to a judicial remedy of
curriculum modification.
The salient issue spawned by the particular controversy is the extent
to which public school curriculum may reflect or refer to values and
concepts found to be religious without constituting government estab-
lishment of religion. These values and concepts may not be presented
in public schools except to the extent that their inclusion is demonstra-
201. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-12, at 870 (1978)), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
970 (1981).
202. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark.
1982); see Brandon v. Board of Educ., 487 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
203. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 151, modified, 479 F. Supp. 525 (1979),
modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284,
1324 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
204. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 151, modified, 474 F. Supp. 5225
(1979), modified, 497 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
1156 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
bly secular in purpose and effect. The greater the degree of congruity
in the religious and secular values of a curriculum, the more likely it is
that the task of distinguishing the one from the other will inappropri-
ately entangle the state in the evaluation of religious questions. The
important status of society's right that public education be free of
religious dogma and the difficult judicial distinctions that are neces-
sary to ensure the protection of this right should make this area of the
law one marked by a particularly careful judicial circumspection.
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